

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS**

T. ROWE PRICE TAX-FREE HIGH YIELD  
FUND, INC., SMITH BARNEY INCOME  
FUNDS/SMITH BARNEY MUNICIPAL  
HIGH INCOME FUND, DRYDEN  
NATIONAL MUNICIPALS FUND, INC.,  
LOIS AND JOHN MOORE and ACA  
FINANCIAL GUARANTY  
CORPORATION

*Plaintiffs,*

v.

KAREN M. SUGHRUE, GARRY L.  
CRAGO, JEAN W. CHILDS, PAULA  
EDWARDS COCHRAN, G. STEVENS  
DAVIS, JR., JULIA B. DEMOSS, WILLIAM  
R. DILL, LESLIE A. FERLAZZO, JOYCE  
SHAFFER FLEMING, ERIC W. HAYDEN,  
CATHERINE CHAPIN KOBACKER,  
ANNE MARCUS, CELESTE REID,  
RICHARD J. SHEEHAN, JR., JOSEPH  
SHORT, GREGORY E. THOMAS, SUSAN  
K. TURBEN, DONALD W. KISZKA and  
ADVEST, INC.,

*Defendants.*

Civil Action No. 04-11667 RGS  
Consolidated into  
Civil Action No. 05-10176-RGS\*

**PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS**

\*The original Motion to Dismiss was filed in the 04-111 67-RGS case but the case has since been consolidated into 05-10176. For the Court s convenience, Plaintiffs have filed their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss under both civil action numbers.

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On May 13, 1998, Bradford College ( Bradford or the College ), a small private liberal arts college in Haverhill, Massachusetts floated a \$17.93 million bond issue, the proceeds of which were to be used to build and renovate dormitories for the school s students. The financing was bold, given that the college had failed to generate any surplus for nine straight years, and had only balanced its budgets by withdrawing money from its endowment or soliciting gifts. Nonetheless, the Official Statement, the offering memorandum pursuant to which the bonds were sold, described a plan to operate profitably in the future based on an increased enrollment and reductions of financial aid. The key to the viability of this vision was selective evidence described in the Official Statement that indicated that the college was successfully attracting increasing numbers of students without having to purchase such admissions by large grants of financial aid. As a result of the representations described in the Official Statement, the five bondholder plaintiffs<sup>1</sup> in this action purchased \$8.37 million of the bonds. The sixth plaintiff, ACA Financial Insurance Corp. ( ACA ), insured an additional \$5.51 million.

Unfortunately, the representations in the Official Statement regarding the College s ability to attract larger numbers of lower cost students were entirely false. The increase in student enrollment was a one year blip, not a long term trend, and the Official Statement failed to include critical information that would have made it apparent that the College would not reach

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<sup>1</sup> Three of the bondholder plaintiffs, T. Rowe Price Tax-Free High Yield Fund, Three of the bondholder plaintiffs, Income Funds/Smith Barney Municipal High Income Fund and Dryden National Municipals Fund, Inc. (collectively, the Institutional Bondholders ) are institutional investors who purchased the Bonds for mutual funds. The remaining bondholder plaintiffs, Lois and John Moore (the Moores ) are a married couple The remaining bondholder plaintiffs, Lois and John Moore, purchased the Bonds from Advest for their own account.

its enrollment targets. With regard to financial aid, the statements regarding financial aid commitments were simply false; aid awards for the present and upcoming years were increasing, not decreasing. The Offering Statement also failed to inform potential bond purchasers of the most serious financial problem facing Bradford, its inability to retain students who enrolled in its classes. The Offering Statement also misrepresented the Plan pursuant to which the College was going to turn around its financial performance. There was no such plan.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to hold the trustees and officers of Bradford<sup>2</sup> and the underwriter of the bonds, Defendant Advest, Inc. ( Advest ) liable for the misrepresentations contained in the Official Statement. All Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims, but because the Plaintiffs have adequately pled the existence of the misrepresentations, even under enhanced pleading rules applicable to securities actions, and because of Defendants responsibility for those misrepresentations, Defendants motions must be denied.

### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

Bradford was a small liberal arts college with an enrollment of less than 500 full time students for most of the 1990s. As noted above, starting in 1989, the College began to routinely operate in the red, running a deficit from its operations for every academic year between 1989 and 2000. Amended Complaint ( AC ), ¶ 60. By 1987, negative cash flow due to the recurrent annual operating losses had reached a critical point. The College s chief financial officer, Defendant Donald Kiszka informed the Board of Trustees in February 1987 that the College only

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<sup>2</sup> Defendant Joseph Short was the President of Bradford from 1988 to 1998. Defendant Donald Kiszka was the Vice President for Administration and Finance. Short and Kiszka are collectively referred to as the "Chief Financial Officers" of Bradford. The sixteen remaining individual defendants were trustees of Bradford at the time of the announcement of the College s closing. They will be referred to herein collectively as the "Trustee Defendants."

had enough cash to survive another 2 to 3 years. AC, ¶ 47. Only by enacting devastating and disruptive cuts and freezing salaries measures the officers and trustees were unwilling to make would there be sufficient cash to operate for five years. AC, ¶ 47. At the very same meeting Defendant Thomas, a member of the Board committee that oversaw the College's admissions admitted there was insufficient enrollment to assure the financial well-being of the College. AC, ¶ 52.

There were several sources for the College's financial problems. Perhaps most pressing was its continued inability to retain students. Only 40 % of its students graduated after matriculation, an extraordinarily high attrition rate. AC, ¶ 49. The New England Association of Schools and Colleges ( NEASC ), the College's accrediting body, found that student retention at Bradford was a crisis and the pre-eminent financial fact NEASC found that attrition was the major cause of Bradford's financial instability and gave the institution scant hope of fulfilling its aspirations. AC, ¶ 53.

Those students who did attend were given generous financial aid awards to entice them. The level of financial aid given to attract students had risen every year since 1989, and had reached a level well above average for comparable institutions in Massachusetts. AC, ¶ 56, 58. In the last full academic year prior to the bond offering, financial aid contributed by Bradford reduced its gross tuition by almost 50%. Official Statement (Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint) at A-14.<sup>3</sup> Effectively, Bradford was purchasing its admissions by awarding

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<sup>3</sup> As is customary in municipal bond offerings, the Official Statement describing the offering, which was signed by MIFA, the state agency formally issuing the bonds, described the operations and financials of the institution. The Official Statement was signed by Short and Kiszka. Most of the misrepresentations and omissions in the Official Statement and Plaintiffs will designate the appendix pages as A-\_\_

substantial financial aid.

For the 1997-98 school year, however, full-time enrollment jumped 13% and the school's matriculation rate for accepted students climbed from 25% to 34%. Official Statement at A-8. The Trustees and Administration at Bradford came to believe that if they could keep increasing enrollment, the College could generate sufficient revenues to survive. The Administration and the Trustees decided to build new dormitories and renovate existing ones to house the new students they hoped to attract. AC, ¶ 42. To finance the construction project, they turned to Defendant Advest to underwrite a tax exempt conduit financing through the Massachusetts Industrial Financing Agency ( MIFA ). Advest determined that \$17.93 million was the maximum bonding capability of the College and agreed to underwrite the issue. AC, ¶ 45. The Trustee Defendants authorized the bond offering in February 1998 on the recommendations of Advest and Defendants Short and Kiszka, the current president and chief financial officer of the College. AC, ¶ 42. One Bradford Trustee, William Nofsker, resigned rather than approve the offering, on the ground that the college did not have sufficient enrollment to justify the expansion plan. AC, ¶ 50.

MIFA issued a \$17.93 million revenue bond offering, dated as of May 1, 1998. The Official Statement described the offering and contained Bradford financial statements and an appendix that summarized the financials and provided operational information relating to Bradford. This section of the Offering Statement was signed by Defendants Kiszka and Short. Official Statement at A-18. Although issued by MIFA, a body politic of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the bonds were not an obligation of the Commonwealth or MIFA and were solely payable by Bradford. Offering Memorandum Cover, 1.



For potential investors, the critical questions necessary to evaluate the risks in the Bradford offering were whether the 1997 increase in enrollment was the beginning of a trend, as opposed to a random occurrence, and whether the school was subsidizing its increased enrollments by liberal financial aid awards. The Official Statement provided false and materially misleading information on both of these critical areas. With regard to admissions, after setting forth a table showing increases in the fall semester headcount from 484 full time equivalent students in 1993 to 584 students in 1997, the Official Statement, at A-13, stated:

To attain the final goal of a balanced budget . . . the College is planning to increase enrollment to the level of at least 725 full-time students by fall 2000, with approximately 80% of those students living in campus facilities. As of April 3, 1998, applications received by the College to date total 879, an increase of more than 18% from April 3, 1997. The total of 879 exceeds total applications received for the fall 1997. . . .Based on this increase in applications, historic rates for conversion of applications into enrollments, the number of applications from freshmen and deposits received to date, the College believes that it can reach its goal of enrolling 225 new students for the fall of 1998 while increasing the quality of its students and reducing slightly the average amount of financial aid awards to such students from College funds.

While application numbers had technically risen, the Official Statement failed to disclose critical information investors needed to know to assess the realistic likelihood that the College would meet its goals. The College did not disclose that despite the increase in applications, the College's acceptance rate—the percentage of applicants it deemed worthy of admission had sharply dropped, from 80% to 70%. The number of actual acceptances had also dropped. AC, ¶ 62. Perhaps even more importantly, the number of students who had committed to attend Bradford by actually paying a deposit—the best indication of how many new students would actually enroll—had declined by almost 20%. AC, ¶ 63.

Moreover, disclosing the increase in the number of applications, even if technically

correct, was misleading because of the College's decision to accept applications off the internet. The college knew that it was easier for web applicants to apply to several schools, making it less likely that such applicants would attend if accepted. The College knew that accepting web applications would artificially inflate the application numbers, but reduce the institution's acceptance and matriculation percentages. AC, ¶ 61.

If the College's disclosure of admission trends was misleading, its disclosures relating to financial aid were outright fraudulent. The Official Statement, at A-13, recited:

[D]uring the 1997-98 academic year, the College estimates that financial aid will be reduced to 29.9% of student income versus 30.3% the previous year. This expected reduction is a result of change in methodology of aiding students with college-funded support versus additional loans funded by students and/or parents. The College's financial plan currently calls for a further reduction of financial aid spending for 1998-1999 academic year to 28.8% of student income.

The Official Statement was dated as of May 1, and not formally released until May 13, AC, ¶ 67,<sup>4</sup> near the end of Bradford's academic year, and long after the financial aid commitments to students attending the fall and spring terms had been made, as well as long after the college had determined the amount of student income it would receive for those two terms. AC, ¶ 56. Financial aid for the 1997-98 academic year actually consumed over 35% of student income, a 17% increase over the preceding year, not a reduction. Moreover, the College knew

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<sup>4</sup> The Amended Complaint has inconsistent allegations regarding when the Official Statement was released to the public. Paragraph 46 states that the bonds were issued as of May 1, 1998, and all papers issued, including, Advest's underwriting agreement, the Loan and Trust Agreement, and an Officers' Certificate signed by Defendants Kiszka and Short certifying that no event has occurred since the date of the financial and statistical event has occurred which needs to be disclosed so that any information in the Official Statement will not be misleading in any material respect. Plaintiffs, of course, can amend their complaint to include this information and clarify the bond issuance date.

its budget figures were misleading because the Spring 1998 enrollment was less than budgeted, while the amount of financial aid committed was \$250,000 more than budgeted. AC, ¶ 56.

The predictions for the forthcoming financial year were also false. Although the Official Statement credited a reduction in the amount of financial aid to a new methodology in calculating aid, such a plan was a fiction. There was no new methodology and the persons responsible for awarding financial aid were never advised or instructed to make any reductions or initiate changes. AC, ¶ 59. Indeed, the College's 1998-99 budget, which was submitted to the Trustee Defendants just two days before the official date of the bond offering, budgeted 31.3% of student income, not 28.8% of student income, on Bradford financial aid. AC, ¶ 57. Moreover, the actual financial aid commitments, which had already been made to the incoming students prior to the May 1 issuance, proved to be even higher, coming in again at 35% of student income. AC, ¶ 70.

The Official Statement did not alert investors to any kind of student retention problem at Bradford. Indeed, by only disclosing fall semester headcounts, instead of fall and spring semester, investors were unable to realize that Bradford's student retention problem was so severe that it lost significant numbers of students after just one semester. Spring semesters historically manifested a 7% attrition rate. AC, ¶ 54.

The Official Statement repeatedly referenced the College's plan to expand Bradford's enrollment and achieve financial equilibrium. But as determined by NESAC, who did its decennial accreditation review just a few months after the bond issuance, there was no such plan. There was no plan to deal with student retention, no plan to reduce financial aid, no plan to increase the student body to the target disclosed in the Official Statement and no plan to

determine why the College's budgeting process required it to go through annual budget crises. In short, NESAC concluded, there was no strategic plan. AC, ¶60.

The Bondholder Plaintiffs each purchased bonds as part of the initial offering from Advest. Advest sought insurance to assist with continuing sales of the bonds. It sent the Official Statement to Plaintiff ACA to review and ACA also had conversations with Kiszka. Based on the representations in the Official Statement and the conversation with Kiszka, ACA agreed to provide financial insurance for \$5.51 million of the bonds. AC, ¶ 66, 67.

In the September after the bond issuance, the problems hidden by the Official Statement rose to the surface. The fall 1998 enrollment was substantially lower than projected by the College, with much of the problem attributable to upperclass attrition. AC, ¶ 68. Those who did attend received record amounts of financial aid. AC, ¶ 70. Financial aid was provided to 90% of the student body, as opposed to a disclosed rate of 80%, and the average recipient got \$9,660, far more than 50% of Bradford's gross tuition. AC, ¶ 72. Although there was no longer a need for expanded dormitory space, Bradford did not cancel the project and return the unspent funds to the Bondholders. Instead, it continued to build dormitories for non-existent students elected to cut funding for student recruitment. AC, ¶ 71, 72.

By the fall of 1999, it was clear that the College could not achieve the enrollment required to pay the bonds. AC, ¶ 75. In November 1999, the College announced that it would cease operations at the end of the school year. AC, ¶ 76. The bonds were declared in default in January, 2000. AC, ¶ 78.

### **PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

TheThe Institutional Bondholders and ACA filed a class action lawsuit relating toThe Institutional Bondholders

bonds in this Court within a year of the announcement of the school's intended close. AC, ¶ bonds in this  
 At that time, however, there was some optimism that an orderly liquidation of  
 might result in payment of the Bonds. All of them might result in  
 into tolling agreements relating to the Plaintiffs' claims, in exchange for the  
 Bondholders and ACA dismissing, without prejudice, the  
 specifically referenced the statutes of limitation and statutes of repose  
 federal and state securities claims, and Defendants agreed  
 statutes as a defense to all the Plaintiffs' claims<sup>5</sup>. Each of the Plaintiffs, is a party. Each of the Plaintiffs  
 beneficiary of, the tolling agreements. AC, ¶ 79.

Bradford filed for bankruptcy in 2001, and concluded, it became clear that the College's assets would not  
 bonds. In July 2004, the bondholder plaintiffs,  
 alleging violations of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10 of the Securities Exchange  
 violation of Section 20 of the 1934 Act (Count II) and violation of Section  
 of 1933 (Count III). At the same time, all of the plaintiffs  
 Superior Court alleging violations of the Massachusetts Uniform Securities  
 Consumer Protection Act, and common law claims of fraud, and common law  
 of fiduciary duty.

Defendants moved to stay the state action pending resolution of the plaintiffs' federal  
 securities claims in this Court and on January 18, 2005 the Superior Court  
 motion. Consequently, on January 21, 2005 the Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add

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<sup>5</sup> Copies of the tolling agreements are attached as Exhibits 1 and 2  
 In Support Of Their Opposition To Defendants' Motions To Dismiss.

aa party and to add thea party and to add the state law causes of action previously only brought in a party and to add  
 IV through VIII of the Amended Complaint. With the exception of those paragraphs IV through VIII of the Am  
 ACA's ACA's issuance of insurance on the bonds, the factual allegations of ACA's issuance of insurance on the bonds  
 Nor were the allegations relating to the federal securities counts Nor were the allegations relating to the  
 Coincidentally Coincidentally the Trustee and Officer Coincidentally the Trustee and Officer Coincidentally the  
 complaint complaint complaint on the same date. The Amended Complaint, however, was filed before the  
 Dismiss and Plaintiffs were aware not of the Bradford Defendants Dismiss and Plaintiffs were aware not  
 of the complaint.<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, Accordingly, although the Court has before it an Amended Complaint, although the Court has  
 previously had the opportunity to address any pleading deficiencies previously had the opportunity  
 Defendants. Defendants. Not surprisingly, Defendants. Not surprisingly, Defendants. Not surprisingly, Defendants.  
 demonstrated below, Plaintiffs believe most of the demonstrated below, Plaintiffs believe most of the  
 ignored. ignored. In the event, however, ignored. In the event, however, that the ignored. In the event, however,  
 some of the pleading intricacies in a some of the pleading intricacies in a federal securities action, they request  
 to cure. Plaintiffs have not pled evidence into cure. Plaintiffs have not pled evidence in their complaint, but they  
 regarding what the Defendants and Bradford did (and did not do) in connection regarding what the De  
 of the bonds and the Official Statement. Given Rule 15's mandate that amendment of the bonds and the Official  
 should be liberally allowed and the acknowledged Byzantine complexity of the should be liberally  
 requirements, see In re Number Nine Visual Technology Corp. Securities Litigation, 51

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<sup>6</sup> This explains why the Court has three motions to dismiss filed by two sets of defendants. This explains why the Court has three motions to dismiss filed by two sets of defendants. Because the Amended Complaint did not alter the allegations relating to the state and federal claims, the Defendants would respond to the Amended Complaint, but the Defendants would not have to address the recently added state and federal claims in its motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

1,1, 27,1, 27, n. 22 ( Number Nine )(Young, J., noting the gamesmanship required to )(Young, J., noting the g  
 aa securities claim is now reminiscent of pre-Federal Rules pleading practices),a securities claim is now reminis  
 given at least one opportunity to repair any pleading deficiencies.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. PLPLA PLAINTIFFS PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS**

SevenSeven of the eight counts Plaintiffs have brought aSeven of the eight counts Plaintiffs have broug  
 omissionsomissions found in theomissions found in the Official Statement.<sup>7</sup> Defendants assert that each of Defend  
 thethe Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existencethe Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of a materially r  
 law,law, and that evenlaw, and that even if such statements or omissionslaw, and that even if such statements or on  
 applicableapplicable pleading standards that attach to these counts. Tapplicable pleading standards that attac  
 standardstandard applies to Countstandard applies to Count I, Plaintiffs' claims for violation of § 10 of the 1934 A  
 underunder the Act. Consequently, if Plaintiffs establish thatunder the Act. Consequently, if Plaintiffs establish  
 ofof action against the Defendants under Count I,of action against the Defendants under Count I, there s  
 successfullysuccessfully plead the misrepresentation elemensuccessfully plead the misrepresentation element  
 Plaintiffs will not repeat the misrepresentation analysis in those sections of this memorandum.

PlaintiffsPlaintiffs allege five categories of misrepresentation in the Official Statement: (1)  
 misrepremisrepresentationmisrepresentation of expected enrollment; (2) misrepresentation of financial aid awar  
 disclosedisclosed anddisclosure and misrepresentation of student retention problems; (4)disclosure and misrep  
 ofof a strategic plan and (5) misrepresentaof a strategic plan and (5) misrepresentation of the of a strategic p

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<sup>7</sup> TheThe only exception is CoThe only exception is Count VIII,The only exception is Count VIII, against the Trustee's  
 fiduciaryfiduciary duties owed to the creditors of Bradfordfiduciary duties owed to the creditors of Bradford  
 Bradford Defendants' motion to dismiss this count.

improvements being financed by the bonds.<sup>8</sup> After setting forth the standards for evaluating the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' pleading, the Court will determine whether they have successfully stated the existence of a strong inference of scienter. Plaintiff will then examine the facts alleged to tie the specific defendant to their 1934 Act claims: whether sufficient facts are alleged to tie the specific defendant to the Officer and Trustee Defendants, whether Plaintiff has person liability under § 20.

A. The Standards For Determining Whether Plaintiffs Have Adequately Pled Their Cause of Action For Violating Rule 10b-5

Even in connection with a motion to dismiss a securities complaint, the standards of Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence still guide this Court. In *Raytheon Securities Litigation*, 106 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165 (D. Mass. 2000), citing 106 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165 (D. Mass. 2000), the Court stated that, in accordance with the law, we must deny the motion to dismiss the complaint as true, and if, under any theory, the complaint as true, and if, under any theory, the allegations are sufficient to state a claim, we must deny the motion to dismiss. *In re Raytheon Securities Litigation*, 157 F. Supp. 131, 145 (D. Mass. 2001).

To state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a false statement or omitted a material fact, with scienter.

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<sup>8</sup> The Amended Complaint does devote a subsection, ¶s 47-48, to the fact that Defendants did not disclose the financial crisis recognized by the Trustee and that Defendants were obligated to disclose the content of that meeting in the Official Statement. However, the Officers and Trustees' recognition that Bradford Washburn's cash to operate is highly relevant evidence of scienter.



reliance upon the statement or omission caused the plaintiffs' reliance upon the statement or omission. 939 F.3d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1996). Claims under 93 F.3d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1996). Claims under 93 F.3d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1996). Pleading specificity requirements established by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. Aldridge v. A. T. C. 2002)( Aldridge ). To meet these requirements, the plaintiff must show a misleading statement or omission, including its time, place and content. In Re PerkinElmer, Inc. Securities Litigation, 286 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (D. Mass. 2003). Plaintiffs must provide support for the claim that the statements or omissions were fraudulent or misleading. Aldridge, 284 F.3d at 78. Plaintiffs are also required to plead sufficient facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraud. In re Cabletron Systems, Inc. 311 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). Notwithstanding the specificity requirements established by Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, the plaintiffs are not required to plead evidence. Cooperman v. Individual, 1999).

Here both sets of Defendants assert that the alleged misrepresentation upon which the Plaintiffs are not material as a matter of law. actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable investor. F.3d at 34. With regard to an alleged omission, the omitted fact is material if the disclosure of the omitted fact would have materially altered the total mix of information made available to the market. 224 F.3d 231-32 (1988). While Rule 10b-5 does not create an affirmative duty to disclose, it will arise if an issuer has previously made a statement of material fact that is

incomplete, incomplete, or misleading in light of the undisclosed information. Gross v. Summa Four, Inc. Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 36 F.3d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1996). In general, the materiality of a fact that should normally be left to jury rather than a judge is a question of fact that should normally be left to jury rather than a judge. Lucia v. Prospect St. High Income Portfolio, Inc., 36 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1994).

With these principles in mind the Court can analyze the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's allegations.

- B. Defendants' Disclosure of Information Regarding Future Enrollment is Misleading and Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged Necessary Scienter.
  - 1. Failure to disclose Bradford's plummeting acceptance number of deposits was misleading, particularly in light of the disclosure of an increased number of acceptances.

As noted above, one of the critical issues for any potential purchaser of Bradford's stock was whether the fall 1997 increase in enrollment was a fluke or the beginning of a trend that would allow Bradford to generate operational surpluses. Had the Official Statement merely stated the College's goal to increase enrollment to 725 students, including 225 students in the fall academic year, it is arguable that such forecasting statements about a company's future, especially when accompanied by a disclaimer that the College might not meet its goal, e.g. In re Stone & Webster Securities Litigation, 253 F. Supp. 2d 102, 117 (D. Mass. 2003).

The Official Statement, however, stated that the College's forecast was based on statistics some disclosed, some undisclosed that purportedly confirmed the College's forecast.

As of April 3, 1998, applications received by the College to date total 879, an increase of more than 18% from April 3, 1997. The total of applications received for the fall 1997. . . . Based on this increase in applications, historic rates for conversion of the number of applications from freshmen to sophomores

College believes that it can reach its goal of College believes that it can reach the fall of 1998 while increasing the quality of its students and reducing slightly the average amount of financial aid a College funds. Official Statement, at A-13. (emphasis added)

As required by the PSLRA, the Complaint describes why this disclosure is misleading. To assert that the College's target is obtainable, misleading. To current and statistics known (or knowable) by applications (which is disclosed); (2) the applications (which is disclosed) (which is disclosed, but is misleading for reasons that are not disclosed), and (3) the deposits received to date (which is not disclosed). Of the most reliable indicator of enrollment for the upcoming year, the College to reserve a place are most likely to attend to the College to repay the bond debt. But the number of deposits received at the time would not increase, but fall. Which is what occurred, AC, ¶ 68.

The historic rate of conversion of applications disclosed)<sup>10</sup> might be relevant if there was reason to believe. However, the College knew, but failed to disclose, that the acceptance rate dramatically, from 80% to below 70%. AC, ¶ 62. This was not because

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<sup>9</sup> The Defendant and Officer Defendants complain that ¶ 62 does not specify reduction applies to. It is obvious from the context of the Amended Complaint that reduction applies to the prior year at the same time. These figures come from Ad of business by Bradford and circulated to, among others, the president and CFO. of business by Bradford and circulated to, among others, such detail in an amended pleading.

<sup>10</sup> The conversion rate could be calculated from the figures on A-8 of the Official Statement. They ranged from a low of 19.7% for the fall of 1994 to on A-8 of the year. Putting aside the extraordinary year of 1997-98, the historic average rate was 20.2%. Taking into account, the average was 21.6%.

more selective due to increased competition for available spots. Even though more selective due to increased competition for available spots, AC intentionally trying to increase enrollment it was actually accepting less students. AC's quality of student applying had declined. AC, ¶ 62.

The one figure the College fully disclosed, the number of applications relevant for evaluating future enrollment. This was clear from the Admissions report on page A-8 of the Official Statement. The year Bradford received the fee on page A-8 of the Official Statement, current year, it had the most enrollments and the highest headcount. The current year, it had the lowest rate of converting applications, 1994, it had the lowest rate of converting applications to 27.1% for 1997). Yet not only did Bradford tout the securities violation, but the Complaint properly alleges that this statistic was misleading because the application numbers were not comparable to prior years without financial disclosure.

TheThe The AmendedThe Amended The Amended ComplaintThe Amended Complaint The Amended Com

toto prior years because Bradford had begun to accept and count standardized web applications,toto prior years b

chanchangechange the College knew artificially inflated the application numbers. AC, ¶ 62. Web apchange the

appliedapplied to more schools because of the ease in applyingapplied to more schools because of the ease in appl

anyany particular school to whichany particular school to which they applied.<sup>11</sup> AC, ¶ 62. Defendants dispute AC,

applicantssapplicants leads to a material change in the acceptance or matriculation ratapplicantss leads to a m

heightenedheightened standard applied to federal securities cases,heightened standard applied to federal s

reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor. It is a reasonable inference thatreasonable inferences in the Plainti

<sup>11</sup> AA web applicant who applies, and is accepted to, ten schools will reject nine. A paperA web applicant who applies, a onlyonly applies, and is accepted to, five schools, will only reject four. only applies, and is accepted to, five schools, will only reject four. W increases,increases, its matriculation rate for accepted applicants will almost cerincreases, its matriculation rate for accepted applicant application applicants into enrollees are much longer.

toto a school to a school with a push of a to a school with a push of a computer key have less commitment than effort to obtain and return a paper application.

Moreover, Defendants ignore the allegation that students who submitted web applications were less likely to attend, that the rate would decline (which it did), and that it knew counting web applications artificially inflated application numbers.<sup>12</sup> If the College itself thought this statistic was not admissions, it should have never been between the two application figures. Thus, to establish that every element that allegedly supported the College's September 1998 goal was misleading.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have not established that the undersigned statistics are material because there are no statistics that the College had materially significant numbers of applications and acceptances from Defendants who made misleading statements to the College in the fall of 2013. The fact that Defendants partially disclosed this information voluntarily demonstrates that the statistics were material in assessing whether Bradwell was qualified for admission to the fall semester. Indeed, the Official Statement presents this information as if these statistics

<sup>12</sup> TheThe Trustee and Officer Defendants question Plaintiffs' source for these allegations. Although the Trustee and Officer Defendants are not required to plead evidence, these allegations are not required to be supported by presentation by Bradford admissions personnel explaining to the Board of Trustees presentation by Bradford admissions personnel. The memorandum describes the softness of internet applications, how half completed applications were included in the application count when a paper equivalent had not historically been included in the application count when a paper equivalent was used. These changes from historical treatment had been introduced by the new system in September 1997 prior to the bond issuance. September 1997 prior to the bond issuance. September 1997 prior to the bond issuance. These facts can be included in an amended pleading.

material to this important factor.<sup>13</sup>

Defendants contend that they cannot disclose its forward looking projections or opinions. But Shaw confirms that even if Defendants had no obligation to disclose the projections, once they had voluntarily disclosed them, they had no obligation to disclose the projections, if there is no reasonable basis for the projection. 82 F. 3d at 1211, n. 21.

Plaintiffs raise an allowable inference that there was no reasonable basis for the prediction, because Defendants did not act in good faith. See Section I.B.2, infra.

It is equally well established that (w)hen a corporation does  
 be voluntary or required--there is a duty to make it complete and accurate  
Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1987). Disclosed facts may not be so., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1987). Disclos  
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910., 910 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1990) (en banc) (quoting., 910 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.19  
Sulphur Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d, 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir.1968), *cert. denied*, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)  
 selective disclosure of admissions data could clearly be found to mislead; it publicized only the  
 favorable statistics, while concealing the more relevant unfavorable information.

Moreover, disclosures which appear to be couched as a projection, frequently make actionable representations about the present. A prediction about the future contains

<sup>13</sup> Defendants fail to consider the well-known admissions cycle for U.S. colleges. Prospective freshmen file their applications in the fall in the winter and early spring. By May 1, the date of the Official Statement, students to guarantee their spaces. Consequently, by May 13, the date that colleges only have made its decisions on virtually all of its applications, but it would have received the admissions information available on May 13 (or May 1) was highly relevant to the upcoming term. If the Court cannot take judicial notice of these facts, Plaintiffs can set them forth in an amended pleading.

implicit/factual assertions: (1) that the statement is genuinely believed, (2) the basis for that belief, and (3) the speaker is not aware of basis for that belief, and (3) the speaker is not aware of any facts that would undermine the accuracy of the statement. Helvig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001); see also In re Sepracor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 308 F. Supp. 2d 20, 33-34 (D. Mass. 2004). For the reasons described above, the selective disclosure described is actionable because it undermined the accuracy of the statement that there was no reasonable basis for belief in light of the most recent, most relevant statistics. Further, for the reasons set forth below, the authors of the disclosure did not genuinely believe the Complaint does not allege misrepresentation without independent investigation. Instead, the Complaint alleges that hard present facts were either not disclosed or misleadingly disclosed.

This claim's focus on the failure to properly disclose pre-enrollment information, such as forecasts, estimates, projections and opinions when such statements are accompanied by cautionary disclosures that adequately advise of the risk that the College may not achieve its enrollment targets, is consistent with the holding in Shaw, 82 F. 2d at 1213. Here, Defendants claim Plaintiffs were disappointed because directly following the enrollment disclosure, the Office of Enrollment Management also stated that the College's failure to achieve this enrollment target would adversely affect the College's ability to reach Financial Equilibrium.

BuButBut as Shaw ma makes plain, the bespeaks caution doctrine has no application to a statement whichwhich has the appearance ofwhich has the appearance of a projection, but also implicitly makes a false statement.

To the extent plaintiffs allege that the . . . statement encomTo the extent plaintiffs allege  
 represerepresentatrepresentationrepresentation of *present fact*, and that such a representation wa

misleading when made, the surrounding misleading when made, the surrounding caution rendered the statement immaterial as a matter of law. *See Harden* [v. RaRaffensperger], 65 F.3d [1392] at 1405-06 (explaining that the be], 65 F.3d [1392] at 140 caution caution doctrine cannot render misrepresentations of hard fact nonactionable]

8282 F.3d at 1213 (emphasis in original) See also In re Number Nine Visual TIn re Number Nine Visual TIn re  
SeSecuritiSecuritiesSecurities Litigation 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D. Mass. 1999)( Number Nine ) ( The besp  
caution defense is inapplicable where,caution defense is inapplicable where, as here, the plaintiffs challenge the  
regardingregarding *presepresent factpresent facts* as opposed to forward-looking statements , citing Shaw (   
original)).

TheThe projections of the fall enrollment are not immaterialThe projections of the fall enrollment are not in  
havehave set forth sufficient facts explaining why the statement was false and misleading. Ashave set forth suffi  
below, they can also make a strong showing of scienter.

2. TheThe Amended CoThe Amended ComplaintThe Amended Complaint The Amended Com  
expected fall enrollment

Liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 19 (1976). This can be pled by allegations that give rise to an inference that defendants said or acted while believing or knowing another. In re Segue Software, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2000 WL 161, 166 (D. Mass. 2000). Plaintiffs must show either that the defendants acted to defraud, or that they acted with a high degree of recklessness. Aldridge, 284 F. 2d at 82.

To meet the heightened pleading requirements forth sufficient facts that give rise to a strong inference of scienter, the inference must not be irrefutable. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 38. Plaintiffs need not foreclose all other characterizations of fact, as the task of weighing



Aldridge, 284 F. 3d at 284 F. 3d at 82. Even 284 F. 3d at 82. Even when evaluating the strength of Plaintiff's case, Plaintiffs are still entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. Id.

Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead scienter. Defendants assert that the traditional badges of scienter, such as insider trading or personal financial interests in the securities, are not present. To require such evidence in securities fraud with regard to any bond issuance by a non-profit organization is not required. The First Circuit, however, has a formula for pleading scienter, preferring to rely on a fact-specific case. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 38.

However, in the leading First Circuit case concerning scienter pleading under Hell, Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.2d 185, 196 (1st Cir. 1999), the Court of Appeals identified certain fact patterns that are relevant to demonstration of scienter, at least two of which are here: the divergence between internal reports and external factual information before making statements. Here, of course, the pronounced optimism in meeting the enrollment targets, reports, which indicated that the College would do significantly worse than reported, which indicated that the pronouncement was also at odds with the current figures. Statement.

Even more probative of scienter, however, is the nature of the statements summarized above, the officers, trustees, and the fall enrollment numbers. Only one of the positive statistics (acceptance rate) was disclosed. Not only were the two negative statistics (acceptance

rate and number of deposits) not disclosed rate and number of deposits) not disclosed

the enrollment target could be met. If the officers, Trustees and underwriters were give prospective investors insight as to the likelihood of Bradford achieving its goal, it is highly doubtful they would have publicized their statistics. On the other hand, if they were attempting to manipulate investors and statistics. On weaknesses that would likely discourage investors from investing precisely in the manner adopted in the Official Statement. The deliberate concealment of relevant statistics while disclosing more favorable, but untrustworthy relevant statistics while disclosing more unfavorable statistics that the Defendants did not act in good faith. And consideration that the application data itself was misleading because of differences between the way applications were obtained in prior years.

The fact that Defendants included and focused upon the app Statement, Statement, Statement, knowing that Statement, knowing that Stat the number of applications, AC, ¶ 62, is also strong evidence of scienter. Knowingly comparing statistics from two periods without disclosing changes in the method of compiling set d statistics from make the comparison dubious is plainly evidence of intent to deceive or manipulate.

The Court can also take into consideration the subjective knowledge of Officers, as evidenced by the February 1987 TrusteOff of the authors of the Official Statement, Kiszka, informed the Board, thatof the authors of the C only survive two or three more years if noonly survive two or three more years if nothing changeonly su Amended Complaint, or the disclosures inAmended Complaint, or the disclosures in the Official Stateme

Statements gives any indication that the financial situation hadStatements gives any indication that the  
 BradfordBradford defendants knowledge of the precarious financial condition, and their failure to make  
 disclosuresdisclosures (or to check the accuracy of disclosures actually madisclosures (or to check the accuracy  
 loanloan funds to that institution, is information the Court can and should consider in weighing whether  
 their conduct was knowing or reckless.

AlthoughAlthough none of the BradfordAlthough none of the Bradford trusteesAlthough none of the Brad  
 issuance,issuance, their knowledge that the school s survival was onissuance, their knowledge that the school s sur  
 inin assessin assessing sciin assessing scienter. Several cases have recognized that the serious deterioration of  
 financialfinancial health is a motive for the alleged fraud and should befinancial health is a motive for the alleged  
Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 39; Aldridge, 284 F.3d at 83; NathensonNathenson v. Nonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d, 267 F.3d 40  
 (5th(5th Cir. 2001). This is(5th Cir. 2001). This is particularly(5th Cir. 2001). This is particularly the case whe  
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 CourtCourt can take into consideration that the Bradford Defendants had invested subsCourt can take into considera  
 professionalprofessional commitment to the College. Itprofessional commitment to the College. It is not surprisin  
 trytry to try to finance a project they viewed as the only viable alternative to liquidation, a stry to finance  
 steadfastlysteadfastly refused tosteadfastly refused to consider. AC, ¶steadfastly refused to consider. AC, ¶ 73.  
 watchwatch would be a personal and professiowatch would be a personal and professionwatch would  
 manipulatingmanipulating the information provided to investors whomanipulating the information provided to inv

Taken together, all of this conduct is more than adequate evidence of scienter.

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<sup>14</sup> TheThe Financial Statement for 1997, attached as The Financial Statement for 1997, attached as AppendiThe Fin  
 releasedreleased seven months after the February 1997 trustees meeting does not indicate any change in the financial condition  
 of the College. Although net assets increased by \$361,600,of the College. Although net assets increased by \$361,600, more than \$1.2  
 unrealizedunrealized gain on investment assets, a surplus which could disappear in short noticeunrealized gain on investment assets, a surp  
 investmentinvestment gains and gifts of more than \$1.35 million, Bradford s operations lost \$4.5 million. Appendixinvestment gains an  
 did things look any better in the current year, in which the operational loss was about the same amount.

C. Defendants Defendants Defendants Disclosure Defendants Disclosure Defendants Disclosure of  
Was Misleading and Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged Necessary Scienter.

1. TheThe stated expectationThe stated expectation that financial aid would likely decrease w  
misleading, misleading, particularly in light of the fact that financial aid awards we  
actually increasing.

TheThe Official Statement devotesThe Official Statement devotes substantial attention to Bradford sThe  
its students. See, e.g. Officialits students. See, e.g. Official Statement at A-10. The tables on page A-10 show t  
of of such awards increased every year of such awards increased every year bof such awards increased every year  
itit clear that the Bradford s grit clear that the Bradford s grants of finit clear that the Bradford s grants of f  
incomeincome it would otherwiseincome it would otherwise have earned. MIFA s disclosure notes that the award  
studentsstudents (along with 10students (along with 10 other factors, such as competition , legislation andstude  
thatthat will affect Bradford s future revenue and expenses. that will affect Bradford s future revenue and exp  
Statement makes it clear that financial aid awards are material to Bradford s finances.

InIn at least three locations,In at least three locations, the Official Statement declares thatIn at least three l  
willwill continue to take steps to reduce thewill continue to take steps to reduce the amount of aid awarded andw  
comparedcompared tocompared to total student revenue.<sup>15</sup> The anticipated reduction is specifically stated to be th

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<sup>15</sup> On page A-13 the Official Statement states:

[D]uring[D]uring the 1997-98 academic year,[D]uring the 1997-98 academic year, theCollege estimates that financial[  
to 29.9% of student income versus 30.3% the previous year. This expto 29.9% of student income versus 30.3% th  
resultresult of change in methodology of aiding students wireresult of change in methodology of aiding students  
additional loans funded by students and/or parents. The College s financialadditional loans funded by students and/o  
callscalls forcalls for a furtherreduction of financial aid spending for 1998-1999 academic year to 28.8  
of student income.

TwoTwo paragraphs later, as part ofTwo paragraphs later, as part of its discussionTwo paragraphs later, as part of its discussion  
thethe Official Statement states that based on an increase in applications, historic conversion rates and the number of  
depositsdeposits received, the Collegedeposits received, the College believes it can meetits fall enrollmentgoal while. . . reducing slightly  
of financial aid awards to such students from College funds.

AndAnd on page A-17, the OfficialAnd on page A-17, the Official Statement states: The strategic initiatives of the CollegeAnd  
andand for the next three years are. . . 3. To increaseand for the nextthree years are. . . 3. To increase net tuition revenues by close manage  
enrollment, prudent use of financial aid and setting of tuition and fee levels to attract students.

of a new program to reduce aid, Official Statement at A-17.

The Amended Complaint plainly pleads sufficient facts to demonstrate that the actual financial aid budget was \$250,000 higher than the budget referenced in the disclosure and that the actual total student income was 35%, not 29.9%--an increase of 14% instead of a 1.3% decrease.

Contrary to Defendants' assertion, the Complaint alleges that the actual numbers were known and knowable at the time the Official Statement was published because in May, just six weeks before the end of the academic term, the College had already received aid it had given to its students for the school year. AC, ¶ 56. Unlike a traditional business, which incurs fulfillment expenses seven weeks before its fiscal year ends, the College's student revenue (and incurred all of its student aid expense) when students returned in September and January. AC, ¶ 56. By May, the College had real numbers,<sup>16</sup> not obsolete numbers.

<sup>16</sup> Even if the Amended Complaint did not allege Bradford's receipt of the discrepancy and the importance of the financial aid data to reasonably infer the current falsity of the projection material falsity regarding Digital's representation that a restructuring reserve was months later Digital did substantially increase its restructuring nature of the problems facing Digital, defendants must have known about the forthcoming change stated that the reserve was adequate. 82 F.3d at 1212-1214. See also Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210-11 (reasonable to infer that Defendant's unsubstantiated allegation that defendant knew about substantial announcement) Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 1999) (reasonable to infer that Defendant know about undisclosed dispute between CEO and know about undisclosed dispute until 4½ months later). See generally Number Nine, 51 F.Supp. at 14-17. (Liability for statement based solely on disclosure of problem at a later date when problem statement based solely on disclosure of its existence at the time of the misleading statement; cannot infer knowledge of inventory valuation merely from an announcement eight months later, but knowledge of other types of corporate announcement eight months later, but know

numbers, to base its disclosures upon.<sup>17</sup>

Once again, because Plaintiffs' claim rests on future projections, the bespeaks caution doctrine does not apply. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 121, 82 F.3d at 121.

Number Nine Visual Technology Corp. Securities Litigation, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Here, the disclosure of the budget projections implicitly stated that Bradford's projections were based on "best estimates" of facts that contradicted the budget numbers. The data, and this was not disclosed to potential investors. Further, the bespeaks caution defense does not apply because there was no particularized disclaimer regarding financial aid. In re Focus Enhancements Securities Litigation, 309 F. S., 309 F. Supp., 309 F. Supp., 309 F. Supp. 2d., 309 F. Supp. 2d. (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

The Official Statement does not warn that financial aid awards, which would appear to be within the complete control of the University, are subject to change without notice.

shorter than eight months.) Here, seven weeks before the end of the fiscal year and shorter than it is eminently reasonable to infer that defendants knew (or percentages were higher than Bradford's budget, even if those figures were no percentages were higher than Bradford's budget of Bradford's year-end financials.

17 Moreover, even if Court ignores the Amended Complaint allegations regarding the existence of hard numbers at the time of the Official Statement, hard numbers at the time of the Official Statement, the Court were invalid because while the total amount of financial aid was comparable to what the spring enrollment figures were lower than predicted by the budget, decreasing student the spring enrollment figures were lower than facts meant the percentage of financial aid to student revenue would need to decrease while the numerator remains the same, the percentage must increase.

<sup>18</sup> The disclaimer on page A-13 states:

If these goals are in fact met and if the College can otherwise budget, it expects to achieve a small operating budget surplus for the 1998-1999 fiscal year. Conversely, failure to achieve this enrollment goal and the resulting increase in operating expenses will adversely affect the College's ability to reach Financial Equilibrium.

The reference to goals in the first sentence quoted above does describe two paragraphs earlier in the Official Disclaimer. Not only does the physical nomenclature as well, supports this reading. In this section of the Official Statement onlythe nomenclature attain a balanced budget and to enroll more students are described as goattain a balanced budget and to enroll more student

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it certainly does not disclose that the budget predictions advanced may be worthless because it certainly does not disclose that the College had made financial aid commitments and awards prior to the time the College had made financial aid commitments. The College had not bothered to calculate whether their projections were consistent with the awards granted.

The Amended Complaint also establishes material falsity for the estimate of financial aid awards for the upcoming year. While the Official Statement states that financial aid for 1998-99 is a further reduction to 28.8% of student income, financial aid for 1998-99 is a further reduction among the Bradford officers and Trustees at the time of the award to the current level to 31.3%. AC, ¶ 57. This translates to a reduction in the amount since the superceded budget discussed in the Official Statement to an operating budget surplus. See Crowell v. Ionics, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (D. Mass. 2005) (determined by effect on income, not revenue; argument that only a small amount of revenue involved is specious). Moreover, the only steps to determining whether Bradford was in control of its financial affairs were the steps to reduce such awards.

Defendants assert the Court should ignore the contemporaneous financial statements. Defendants assert the Court should ignore the financial statements if its final version was completed after the offering, sometime in May 1998. Merely because the budget was finalized after the Official Statement does not mean the budget was finalized after the Official Statement does not mean the Court can infer that information from the financial statements.

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disclaimer specifically refers to this enrollment goal, indicating that the disclaimer specifically refers to this enrollment goal to enrollment goals. At a minimum the disclaimer is ambiguous.

Yet even if it could be interpreted to warn of the uncertainty of the estimates for the next academic year, 1998-99; it does not mean that the estimates for the next academic year might be materially different.

statement was known before the date of tstatement was known before the date of thstatement wa  
responsibleresponsible for the misrepresentation would likely have known the information. responsible for the mi  
F.F. Supp.F. Supp. at 14-17. See also footnote 16, infra, and authorities cited, and authorities cited therein. The bu  
drafteddrafted by Defendantdrafted by Defendant Kiszka, wasdrafted by Defendant Kiszka, was circulated to the  
ofof the Official Statement, and reviewed by the Finance Committee of the Board of Trustees a week  
before the May 13 closing. Drawingbefore the May 13 closing. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of th  
cancan infer that the discrepancies betweenecan infer that the discrepancies between the financial aidcan infer that  
thethe Bradford Defendants (and could have been discoveredthe Bradford Defendants (and could have been discov  
Accordingly,Accordingly, Plaintiffs haveAccordingly, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient allegations to find that the fir  
were false at the time of the Offering.

The Official Statement also recited that the financial aid was the implementation of a new methodology which sought to replace grants with loans to students and parents. Official Statement at A-13. This initiative had been in place for the past two years. Official Statement at A-17. But the Amended Complaint alleges that there was no initiative. Not only was there no plan to modify Brainerd aid practices, no one instructed the persons responsible for aid practices, nor did the officers or Trustees take any steps to control the amount of aid.

19 In fact, In fact, a May 26, 1998 memorandum from In fact, a May 26, 1998 memorandum from Defendant Kiszka demon-  
toto financial aid numbersto financial aid numbers between the original version circulated in April and the final version approved into finan-  
memorandummemorandum describes the changes that were made and thmemorandum describes the changes that were made and the  
variousvarious departments, which were various departments, which were cut by \$300,000. He identifies no changesvarious departments  
financialfinancial aid financial aid numbers. Thus,financial aid numbers. Thus, earlier versions of the budget that were circulated before  
thethe increased fthe increased financial aidthe increased financial aid to student income ratio that conflicted with the disclosure  
Allegations containing this information, if necessary, can be added to an amended pleading.

<sup>20</sup> The Amended Complaint does not set forth the existence of the alleged changes in financial aid awards. It is, of course, difficult to reach this conclusion based on their examination of the evidence.



of any plan to control financial aid, especially in light of the increasing of any plan to control financial aid. The fact that financial aid was being discounted is clearly something investors would find material. It would demonstrate that Bradford's optimistic statements that they had a plan to control financial aid was false. Indeed the lack of such a plan would help investors assess whether Bradford's goal of financial equilibrium was likely. Asserting that a plan was in place to reduce financial equilibrium was likely. As such, the statement that a plan existed, is plainly a materially false statement.

2. Defendants' failure to disclose the financial aid data contradicted the disclosures in the Official Statement in a negative light is strong evidence of scienter.

The same evidence that supports the strong inference of scienter with regard to enrollment data supports such a finding with regard to the financial aid figures. Indeed, the evidence is stronger. With regard to enrollment, Defendants were falsely disclosing favorable statistics while suppressing more relevant information. Defendants possessed highly relevant information, Defendants' statements around that directly contradicted the hard numbers presented in the Official Statement. Defendants were intentionally lying or they were practicing willful blindness and did not disclose the most recent data. And in the case of the actual financial aid figures, these figures were not fresh, they were months old; and these figures were not fresh, they were months old and have been updated as part of the complete disclosure that was mandated for a bond issuance.

Plaintiffs' scienter allegations compare favorably to the scienter allegations in the Official Statement.

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aid records, none of which discuss a new financial aid methodology or contain any information regarding the crisis. Additionally, plaintiffs' investigator interviewed, Jean Scott, the President of Bradford University in September 1998. When faced with a financial crisis, she sought to understand the problem's origins. Plaintiffs believe she would testify that she understood the problem's origins. Plaintiffs believe that she planned for reducing aid, but that over time, generous tuition discounting, and other factors became principal reasons for the crisis. Factual allegations to this effect can be added, if necessary, to an amended pleading.

sufficiently sufficient in Number Nine. To support their claim that inventory was overvalued on a financial statement, the class plaintiffs in Number Nine relied upon articles in trade publications that computer hardware comparable to that marketed and being replaced by newer technology. The company's products and there was no evidence that any of the defendants read the articles. Reference to the articles was sufficient to meet the First Circuit's and the PSLRA requirements.

The Court holds that the above-referenced trade publication excerpts satisfy the pleading requirement with respect to scienter. Accepting the representative as representative of as representative of as representative of either knowingly misrepresented the value of either knowingly misrepresented the value of either it made the challenged statements, or recklessly disregarded its failing to remain informed of important developments in the market for graphics cards.

5151 F. Supp. 2d at 27. If failing to remain abreast of trade publications (and a consequent 51 F. Supp. 2d at 27. make an accounting adjustment based on such trade make an accounting adjustment based on such trade to infer scienter, failing to stay abreast of important internal data that directly contradicts the representations must, at a minimum, also constitute representations must, at a minimum, also constitute Circuit has recognized that publishing statements when Defendants Circuit has recognized that publishing statements when Defendants statements were inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete statements were inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete F.3d at 83.

A strong inference of scienter can also be inferred from the Official Statement's claims that a program was in place to reduce financial aid awards when no such program existed. Plainly, the positive statement that a plan is positive statement that a plan is in place strongly infers that the authors and publishers of such statements intended to deceive the

the Official Statement, or that they were culpably reckless about reporting the non-existing policies and methodologies. See e.g. In re Lernout & Haupsie Securities (D. Mass. 2002) (officers likely knowledge of fictitious claims was sufficient evidence of scienter).

Even if no specific single allegation contained enough inference of scienter, the plaintiff may combine various facts and circumstances—the nature of the false statements, the ease with which truthful and accurate information could have been found, the internal documents known to Defendants that contained true information, Defendants' clear knowledge of Bradford's desire to save the College headed for an audacious borrowing program to attract potential enrollees—strongly infer that the placement of false information constituted negligence. Either Defendants intended to deceive or they recklessly refused to check financial records without concern of the financial danger they were creating for investors.

D. Defendants' Failure To Disclose Bradford's Student Retention Crisis Misleading and Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged Necessary Scienter.

1. By failing to make necessary disclosures of the retention crisis, the Official Statement was materially false and misleading.

The Amended Complaint states that Bradford had an attrition rate of greater than a historical, longstanding problem with retaining students. AC, ¶ 49. This was a principal cause of Bradford's financial crisis, which was an organizational pre-eminent financial fact. AC, ¶ 53, 54. Defendant

Bradford was material and that it had to be disclosed; they defended that they adequately disclosed in the Official Statement.<sup>21</sup> This is simply not so. If the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint overstated the contents of the Official Statement, the Amended Complaint would be summarily dismissed.

DeDefendants Defendants claim they adequately disclosed the College s attrition and student retention problemproblem on pages A-7 andproblem on pages A-7 and A-11, but, suspiciously, do not quote the language w disclosure.disclosure. disclosure. There are indeed references to student retention on those pages, but only a disclosure wouldbe able to divine the exwould be able to divine the existencewould be able to divine the existence disclosedisclosure on p. A-7disclosure on p. A-7 occurs in the middle of the section entitled The disclosure on p. BradfordBradford intends to Bradford intends to do with tBradford intends to do with the bond proceeds, as opposed or operational condition.

[illegible]

Additionally, as described below, there are misleading disclosures of information regarding the attrition problem to be disclosed for information regarding the attrition of the Official Statement entitled Bondholders' Risks, the issuer warns of the future difficulty attracting students. When an issuer warns about a current problem as only being a future difficulty attracting students, disclosure is misleading unless the truth about the current problem is fully disclosed. 24-25. Also, the disclosure of fall enrollment statistics was misleading unless disclosed. See AC, ¶ 54, and footnote 23, *infra*.

The primary purpose of the Project is to expand residential capacity, T will enable Bradford College to accommodate addition, the Project will enhance the residential component of Bradford College, with anticipated corresponding improvements to position of the College and position of the College and its ability. Project is necessary due to the deteriorated condition of the West residence halls and the Cluster Houses.

Such language hardly constitutes the disclosure of a student the reader would hardly know that most Bradford College enrollment fact that the administration considers the Project useful in retaining students is not the equivalent of conceding an attrition problem.

The reference on p. A-17 is even more innocuous. In the section entitled Strategic Initiatives, the Official Statement describes the Office of Planning and Transition.

The Coordinator works with faculty and to the Cabinet and the Trustees, to review, revise and establish programs to the C services to attract and retain students.

Paraphrasing the job description of an employee who is concerned with student attraction retention is not the equivalent of informing potential retention is not the equivalent of informing potential i at Bradford has been impossible because the College cannot accurately at Bradford has been impossible because students will be present in subsequent semesters. All existing customers. Making brief references to these activities does not constitute severe retention or attrition problem.

Defendants also contend D at A-8, that the spring 1998 enrollment figures, which record a reduced enrollment from the fall number. But the spring figures are not disclosed in the same manner as the fall figures, and it is difficult to

determine whether the difference between the total number of students (only a 2.7% decrease) or 36 students (a more students (only a 2.7% decrease) or 36 students (a there is no description, there is no description, much less analysis, of the difference in investors would not know whether such discrepancies are expected and normal (in investors would not semester attrition rate was lower than the historical 7% mid year attrition rate, AC ¶ semester otherwise accounted for, such as due to a group of juniors taking spot otherwise accounted for, such as affiliated institution. Even if a reader was a statistics, the publishing of a single spring student numbers, without explanation statistics, the publishing not identify a material problem concerning attrition. not identify most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Official Statement is misleading.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, Defendants rely on the Official Statement drafted by MIFA. In the subsection dedicated to Dependence on Tuition, MIFA describes Bradford's goal of increasing enrollment.

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<sup>22</sup> The Official Statement recites (s)pring 1998 full- and part-time enrollment was 550 full-time students and 32 part-time students for Fall 1997, and lists a headcount of 602. The difference is due to a category in the table of 602. The difference is due to Official Statement states whether the spring total is merely the sum of the full and part-time students (550 + 32 = 582) or if it includes the 16 enrolees (582 + 16 = 598). The Official Statement compares figures in the Official Statement that were not directly laid out for comparison purposes.

<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the Amended Complaint alleges that the failure to track the spring enrollment for several years, in a manner comparable to how the fall semester's enrollment was tracked, was a serious problem that haunted Bradford year after year. Investors would have also known that the College not only had to find new students to replace the higher entering class targets, it had to find students to replace the students who had abandoned the school after a semester.

Further, investors would certainly think twice before loaning the institution an unprecedented amount of money if there would be far fewer alumni than would have been anticipated by the institution. This is particularly important with regard to an institution that repeatedly exceeded its budget. If there would be fewer alumni in the following years due to heavy attrition, there would be fewer alumni to pay the bond debt.

2000, and notes (a) failure by the Institution to attract and retain students2000, and notes (a) failure by the  
accomplishsuch goal could adversely affect the abiaccomplish such goal could adversely affe  
paymepayments. payments. Officpayments. Official Statement at 8. This boilerplate truism concerning fu  
constituteconstitute adequate disclosure of an existing, presentconstitute adequate disclosure of an existing, pres  
and scienter.

Disclosing a known, existing problem as mere  
Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989)(disclosure of future problems with new product when serious disclosure was actionable); Number Nine, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 24-25, v.v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F. 2d 534, 544 (8th Cir., 1981)( To warn that the untoward event is contingent is prudent,when the event is contingent is prudent, to caution that the event will happen when they have already occurred is deceit. ). Here, a very real and threatening attrition crisis affected the ability of the institution to survive and were no more likely than revenue fluctuation due to governmental regulation and development affecting the federal or state tax-exempt status of non-profit organizations.  
11. Investors had a right to know of a serious retention crisis at the time they were deliberately not informed.

2. FaFailureFailure to dFailure to disclose a known and urgent crisis raises a strong inference of scienter.

TheThe attritioThe attrition crisis at Bradford is the 800 pound gorilla in the living room. It waThe dominatingdominating and pre-eminent financiadominating and pre-eminent financial fdominating and pre-eminent financial failure failure to deal with attrition could not be an accident; at best it was willful ignfailure to deal with attrition

equivalent of culpable recklessness. The scope of culpable recklessness is defined by the scope of culpable negligence. It is evidence of scienter.

Defendants contend that their references to student reintent intent to conceal or mislead. Yet the alleged disclosures are so tepid, so colorless,intent to conceal or m completelyconsistent withan intent to mislead. They raised the possibility without disclosing the reality actually facing the College. Had defendants aa complete disclosure they would have been more forthcoming. The fact reading of what they wrote would not lead a potential investorreading o is sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Livid Hold  
SalomonSmithBarney,SalomonSmithBamey, Inc., \_\_\_F.3d, \_\_\_F.3d \_\_\_, 2005 WL 767100, \_\_\_F.3d \_\_\_, 200 alleges thatdefendantsalleges thatdefendants alleges thatdefendants knewalle made, heightened pleading standard for scienter has been met).

AdditionalAdditionally, Additionally, of course, the other facts and circumstances described considered in examining whether sufficient scienter has been alleged. For the reasons described above, scienter also exists regarding the failure to disclose the College's attrition situation.

E. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged Defendants' False Disclosure of a Strategic Plan

The Official Statement pegs BraThe Official Statement pegs Bradford sThe Official Statement pegs Bra  
describeddescribed in the Official Statement as the College s strategidescribed in the Official Statement as the  
referencesreferences to these initiatives in the Official Statement. The Amended Complaint alleges, that there  
waswas no plan to deal with the attrition crisis, nowas no plan to deal with the attrition crisis, no plan towas no plan

24 AdvestAdvest claims that BrAdvest claims that Bradford never rAdvest claims that Bradford never represented that OfficialOfficial Statement explicitly refers to Bradford s strategicplan onOfficial Statement explicitly refers to Bradford s strategicpl to being able to pay the bonds.



toto stated to stated goal) of increasing enrollment. AC, ¶ 59. Indeed, according to NEASC, the accredito stated body, body, Bradford s current body, Bradford s current planning for recruitment, retention, faculty body, Bradford many many other parameters was inconsistent with their goal of enrolling over 700 students within two and a half years. AC, ¶ 60. There may have been goals, but there was no plan.

Defendants Defendants attempt to trivialize t Defendants attempt to trivialize this allegati Defendants attempt Official Official Statement lie Official Statement lied whe Official Statement lied when it claimed that Bradford Mischaracterizing Mischaracterizing Plaintiffs allegations will not make them go away. Mischaracterizing Plaintiffs having having a dream and having a plan having a dream and having a plan to make the dream having a dream and ha did not exist. Falsely stating that such a plan existed is a materially false misrepresentation.<sup>25</sup>

The The Bradford Defendants point to affirmative steps that Def The Bradford Defendants point to enrollment, enrollment, particularly relying enrollment, particularly relying on marketing plan the College commis Associates, Associates, which is referenced in Associates, which is referenced in the Official Statement Associates in in the pas in the past do in the past does not mean that it had a current plan at the time of the offering to objectives set objectives set out by its former consultant.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the Official Statement acknowledges Mor the the Dehne pl the Dehne plan was me the Dehne plan was merely a marketing plan, not a strategic plan continued existence. The fact that the continued existence. The fact that the Trustees solicited a marketing plan

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<sup>25</sup> The The difference between a representation about the existence of a The difference between a representation about the e about about attempting to meet the goals of the plan must be ma about attempting to meet the goals of the plan must be made cle about Defendants Defendants did not misrepresent current conditions that made attainment of the plan s goals unlikely, Defendants cannot be be held liable merely be held liable merely for not meeting the plan s goals. Indeed, securities law assumes the market disc assertion assertions assertions about meeting distant plan goals. But even if the market does not expect the issuer to meet all of its goaas it it clearly is material that there is a concrete plan. With Bradford s track record, it clearly is material that there is a concrete plan. With would would have entrusted any funds with Bradford had the college disclosed would have entrusted any funds with Bradford had the colleg the investor that it had no concrete plan to meet the goals necessary to permit repayment of the bonds.

<sup>26</sup> According According to the Official Statement, the Dehne plan According to the Official Statement, the Dehne plan wa 1997, 1997, a year before the offering. It is not 1997, a year before the offering. It is not the strategic plan or strategic initiative that the Off then currently existing at the time of the bond offering.

conclusive evidence that the strategic plan claimed by the Official Statement really existed.

The Court must take the allegations of the Complaint as true. If no plan existed, bThe College represented the existence of such a plan to get investors to fund unachievable objectives, the Official Statement contained a material falsehood.<sup>27</sup> Further, the false representation of a fictional plan leads to a strong inference that the plan in a document designed to raise money intended to deceive the potential investors.

F. Defendants Defendants Disclosure That Bradford Would Contribute \$1 MiDefendants Dis  
RenovationRenovation ProjectRenovation Project When It Had No Intention of Making Such a C  
False, Misleading and Intentional

The final material misrepresentation alleged by the Plaintiffs are the statements on the Official Statement that the dormitory construction and renovation project will be paid for by the bond proceeds and an equity contribution of \$1 million from Bradford. Although Bradford's commitment is not conditioned in the Official Statement,<sup>28</sup> minutes of the Board of Trustees demonstrate that the Trustees had no intention to make such a commitment on behalf of the College. The Finance and Building and Grounds Committees of the Board of Trustees, composed of 11 of the individual defendants, recognized that the bond proceeds would be insufficient to pay the full costs of the renovation, but refused to do so.

<sup>27</sup> Further evidence of the lack of a plan, not currently included in the complaint by an amendment, is the fact that the budget cuts being considered by Defendants at the time of the Offering directly contradicted the Official Statement. The cuts being considered (and ultimately adopted) included cuts to the admissions and financial aid offices, the officers and trustees knew would hinder the ability to meet their enrollment targets, the officers and trustees knew would hinder the college's ability to raise money, and student services which the Official Statement claimed the College would improve. Indeed, while the Official Statement discloses planned growth and expansion, it also states that would make it impossible to recruit the students or carry out the programs necessary to pay the bond debt.

28 On page 10, the Official Statement states that the State will "toto build and renovate campus buildings. A table on the same page informs million. AC, ¶ 46.

make up the difference. Instead, the committee make up the difference. Instead, the committee added) be made to reduce construction costs so added) be made to reduce construction costs so added) be made to reduce construction costs so

If a contribution had to be made, Bradford would only do so at the end of the fiscal year.

The Official Statement did not disclose the conditional nature of the contribution.

Defendants primary defense to this claim is that the meeting minutes do not support the allegation that the bondholders contributed to making the contribution. But the minutes are clear. *Every effort* is to be used so that Bradford is to be used so that the project will be built solely using the bondholders money. The meeting minutes, which verbatim in the Amended Complaint, AC, ¶ 65, support the allegation.<sup>29</sup>

[illegible]

Plaintiffs do not devote any paragraphs of the

<sup>29</sup> In fact, Bradford never made the contribution. This fact is not in the pleading inserted in an amended pleading.

materiality of the misrepresentation. Yet materiality is obvious. In representation that the borrower will make a sizeable equity contribution, in is clearly material. Such a contribution insures the bondholders that it is clearly material. Such a contribution is at risk, and that the project has value to the borrower as well. Further, the amount of an equity contribution is directly relevant to the value of property the consideration if the bondholders are not to be repaid. The borrower's failure to obtain repayment, as, of course, occurred in this case. To the extent Plaintiffs' failure to explain materiality is a pleading defect, this defect can easily be cured by amendment.

ScienterScienter is not an obstacle to this cScienter is not an obstacle to this claim. At Scienter is no OfficialOfficial Statement and the underwriteOfficial Statement and the underwriter would Official Statement a thatthat Bradford had in fact authorized thethat Bradford had in fact authorized the bond issuance. Thethat Bradford makemake an equity contribution unless there was no other choice would have been reviewed at the same timetime and both the authorstime and both the authors and the underwriter would have known that thetime and bo anan equity contribution. Nonetheless, they did not correct or modify the disclosures in the Official Statement.Statement. Ignoringthe black and white mandateStatement. Ignoringthe black and white mandate of the scienter.

G. Plaintiffs Have Met The Minimal Burden Adequately

Although a Rule 10b-5 complaint must allege Although a Rule 10b-5 complaint must allege Although a Rule 10b-5 complaint must allege

is not subject to is not subject to the heightened pleading standards for allegations of misrepresentation is not subject to the heightened pleading standards for allegations of misrepresentation is not subject to the heightened pleading standards for allegations of misrepresentation

Crowell v. Ionics, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D. Mass.), 243 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D. Mass.)

v.v. Broudo, Docket No. \_\_\_\_\_, slip op. at 10 (April 19, 2005 ) ( Dura Pharmaceutical v. Broudo, 2005 WL 867107 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2005) )

(causation) pleading rules are not meant to impose a causation pleading rule (causation) pleading rules are not meant to impose a causation pleading rule (causation) pleading rules are not meant to impose a causation pleading rule

is the is the causis the causal connection between a material misrepresentation and the alleged loss. Pharmaceutical at 6. The common law principles of proximate causation are applied to determine whetherwhether lowwhether loss causwhether loss causation has been properly alleged. Dura Pharmaceuticals Restatement (Second) of Torts, treatises on Tort law and Massachusetts common Restatement (Second) be examined to determine elements of loss causation).

AlthoughAlthough DuraDura Pharmaceuticals, the recent Supreme Court decision on securities, the recent causation, causation, does not causation, does not provide much guidance on the necessary nexus causation, does not loss loss and loss and thloss and the alleged misrepresentations,<sup>30</sup> courts have required that the subject of the fr statement statement or omission was the cause of the actual loss statement or omission was the cause of the actual loss 1099, 1099, 1108 (D. Mass. 1991) the Plaintiffs must allege that they 1099, 1108 (D. Mass. 1991) the Plaintiffs m materialized materialized were the risks of which they were unaware as a result of defendants misleading statements.

Here, Here, Plaintiffs allege Here, Plaintiffs allege that the very risks they contend defendants concealed th disclosed disclosed disclosed expected enrollment in the fall 1998 , AC ¶ 68; the ballooning financial aid awards

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<sup>30</sup> DuraDura Pharmaceuticals merely holds that a simple allegation of a pur merely holds that a simple allegation of a sufficient sufficient pleading of loss causation. Slip op. at 7-9. The Court expressly declined to sufficient pleading of loss causation. Slip or loss-related questions. Id. at 9.

tuition discounting, AC, ¶¶ 70, 75; the historic level of student of a strategic plan, ¶ 74 led to the financial crises that caused the default on the bonds. AC, ¶¶ 74-76. As a result of that default, the principal amount of the bonds remains unpaid. AC, ¶ 78. Plaintiffs' losses are caused by the materialization of the losses are caused by the concealment in the Official Statement. Moreover, it is result in an inability to pay the bonds.

Defendants contend that the allegations in the Amended Complaint pleading that the Plaintiffs' losses were caused, as a matter of law, by other adequately warned about in the Official Statement. By ignoring the allegations of the Amended Complaint cited in the preceding paragraph, and relying on those allegations favored by Defendants, the Court would violate a cardinal rule of Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence, that all allegations the Court would view the Complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Complaint. Securities Litigation, 224 F. Supp. 2d 319, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (although other complaint were possible, loss causation adequately alleged when all inferences drawn in plaintiffs favor).

Nor can defendants rely upon allegations relevant to the count to attempt to dismiss the 1934 Act claims. Rule 8(e)(2) permits the Plaintiff to attempt to dismiss alternative theories of liability and such claims do not have to be a causation allegation related to one theory of liability cannot be used as an alternative count. Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 20-21 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1997). The merely because plaintiffs alleged in their breach of fiduciary duty merely because plaintiffs alleged in their

the failure of the Bradford Defendants to close the College enrollment in fall 1998, AC, ¶ 72, or that the enrollment in fall 1998, AC, ¶ 72, or that the enrollment assured that the College could never recruit sufficient students to ¶ 71, does not mean that these events were ¶ 71, does not mean that these misrepresentations in the Official Statement misrepresentation. Moreover, a defense that the plaintiffs' losses were caused by some intervening event other than the alleged misrepresentations indisputably 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Emergent Capital Investment Management Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 2003); Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 2004 WL 2203482 \*12 (D. Mass. 2004) (Woodcock, J.).

Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' losses were Defendant's knowledgeable is also unavailing. Once again Defendant's losses were the basis of their defense.

31 Even if the inconsistent allegations related to the breach of fiduciary duty in evaluating whether causation had been adequately alleged, the Court would have to deny the Defendant's First, the Amended Complaint does not allege that these two events were the *sole* cause of Plaintiffs' damage. While these events may have harmed the plaintiffs, these allegations do not require a finding that the misrepresentation is completely consistent with Plaintiffs' claim that the misrepresentations caused their investment budget crisis was directly caused by the lower than expected budget crisis was directly caused by the lower than expected and the historic attrition problems, all of which Defendants know and Statement t. These undisclosed events caused the College to make additional cuts that destroyed their financial goals, a completely foreseeable event given the looming financial bad news Defendants failed to disclose in May 1998.

TheThe allegations here must be contrasted with the facts inThe allegations here must be contrasted with the facts in MilleM  
Supp. 1099, 1108Supp. 1099, 1108 (D. Mass. Supp. 1099, 1108 (D. Mass. 1991)), the case relied upon by the Defendants. There, ~~that~~  
thattheir losses were not caused by the subjectthat their losses were not caused by the subject of the misrepresentations. The alleged  
defendants,defendants, managers of adefendants, managers of a junk bonddefendants, managers of a junk bond fund, would only invest in  
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admittedadmitted the losses were caused solely by the cadmitted the losses were caused solely by the collapse of admitted the losses  
analogousanalogousconcession for example, that Branalogous concession for example, that Bradfordanalogous concession for example,  
to fail would the Court be justified in dismissing on loss causation grounds at this stage.

achieve its desired objectives fails to sufficiently warn investors that there are present factors known (or recklessly ignored) by Defendants that strongly indicate were not going to be met. See Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2004), discussed in detail at 80, infra. I If Defendants argue disclaimer that an investment involves risk and the investor might lose his investment immunize all transactions from liability on loss causation grounds, the fraud, the investor was warned about the very contingency which occurred, the fraud, the investor investment.

H. Plaintiffs Can Sufficiently Tie All of the Defendants To Violations of the Plaintiffs Can S

[illegible]

1. AdvestAdvest was reckless in failing to confirm easily accessible infoAdvest was re relevant to the bond offering

AdvAdvestAdvest concedes, as it must, that as the underwriter for the bond offering it had a dAdvest co performperform a reasonable investigation.perform a reasonable investigation. Glassman v. Computervision Corp. (1996).1996). This is particularly true for1996). This is particularly true for 1996). This is particularly true for exemptexempt from the registration requirements, but the SEC has exempt from the registration requirements underwritersunderwriters to provide accurate disclosures underwriters to provide accurate disclosures to prospective investors1717 CFR §240.15c2-12. Where an underwriter's conduct constitutes a sufficiently extreme departure



from the standards of the profession, scienter is established. SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 859 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001).

The First Circuit has identified at least two components of the investigation. First, the underwriter must continue to investigate the issuing entity of the offering. Glassman, 90 F.3d at 628. Second, the underwriter cannot rely solely on representations of management where it is possible of the Complaint make it plain that Advest failed both of these duties.

Here, plaintiffs have alleged that material out of the Official Statement, particularly the obsolete financial aid data and the predictions from outdated budgets. AC, ¶¶ 56, 57, 62, 63. It can reasonably be inferred that Advest determined whether updated information would determine whether updated information would Advest plainly knew that the College possessed actual data on financial aid spending for the almost completed school year which would have contained the latest financial data among Bradford Officers and Trustees at the time the bond offering was in its final stages.<sup>32</sup>

It is also clear from the Complaint's allegations that Advest's projections contained in the Official Statement. The true status of the College's enrollment prospects for the next year were set forth in Advest's most recent report would have verified the selective disclosure relating to the most recent

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<sup>32</sup> The Official Statement, at A-17, states that a revised budget for the upcoming year was presented to the Trustees and the Finance Committee in May.

<sup>33</sup> To the extent this fact is not currently in dispute, it is not currently in dispute. To the extent this fact is not currently in dispute, it is not currently in dispute.

updated budgets were also readily available from Defendants Kiszka Trustees. The February 1998 Trustees minutes, which Advest would have reviewed to in the bond offering had been authorized, would have let Advest know that the bond offering had been authorized to make a \$1 million equity contribution, and a review of the revealed the depth of the financial crisis, including Kiszka's accurate prediction that the College could only survive for two or three more years, and the extent of the simple request to review the Strategic Initiative Statement, or the new methodology that allegedly determined that these programs and plans did not exist. It is impossible to determine who was actually attempting to verify the statements in the Official Statement would these discoveries.

The ease with which the truth could have been determined by sufficient to infer sufficient recklessness on the part of an under to question and investigate. However, there are additional facts that Court does not believe these are sufficient facts are alleged in the Amended Complaint. Court does not include that Advest only visited the College twice, that it never requested contingency plans provided by Bradford, that it accepted projections with facially unreasonable assumptions and obsolete budget data provided by Bradford to update the information. If the current allegations are insufficient, Plaintiffs update to further describe Advest's reckless conduct.

Advest also contends that it cannot be held

because it was not the author of the false and misleading statements in the Official Statement, but only had review and approval responsibilities. Relying on Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), it contends that the alleged misrepresentations can be found liable under Section 10(b). However, Bank does not always shield underwriters from primary liability. 2d Cir. 330, 341 (D. Mass. 2005). Primary liability may be imposed on those who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud at the time of its perpetration. SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1996) quoting Azreilli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1994).

In evaluating Advest's role in the fraud at issue, the court considers the underwriter plays in municipal bond offerings. As will be discussed below, the issuer's role in the offering is also relevant.

II.A.1 infra, the issuers and beneficiaries of municipal bond offerings, the issuers and beneficiaries of municipal bond offerings are typically non-profit entities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2) and (4). To insure that investors do receive accurate disclosures regarding the relevant entities in a municipal bond offering, the SEC has passed Rule 15c2-12, 15 CFR § 240.15c2-12, which places primary responsibility for the distribution of financial and operating information material to the evaluation of the offering on the securities dealer. Under Rule 15c2-12, a securities dealer cannot underwrite or even recommend a municipal security unless it has reviewed the offering's official statement, taken responsibility for distributing the offering's official statement to potential purchasers and potential purchasers of the bonds, and insured that the offering will be available through municipal security information repositories. 15 CFR § 240.15c2-12(b) and (c). The SEC also requires the issuer to provide certain information to the SEC and the public. The SEC also requires the issuer to provide certain information to the SEC and the public.

Responsibilities, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26100, § III, 53 C.F.R. 37778 (Sept. 20, 1988)

In its official Interpretation of an underwriter's responsibilities in a municipal security offering, which the SEC promulgated at the same time it proposed Rule 15c2-11, the SEC has emphasized the vital position the underwriter plays in such offering. the SEC has emphasized that, in regard to negotiated municipal offerings, such as the one involved in this case, that the underwriter will be involved in the preparation of the offering, the underwriter must review a near complete draft of the official statement before the offering, the offering, the SEC expects it will often influence the content of the offering, committing to an offering. Municipal Underwriter Responsibilities. Municipal Underwriter Responsibilities. Release No. 26100, § III, 53 CFR 37778, 37789-90 (Sept. 28, 1988). Release No. 26100, § III, 53 CFR 37778, 37789-90 (Sept. 28, 1988). expectations have been proven correct, the underwriter's representations in the offering documents, including the disclosures. See e.g. SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 854 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001).

While it is possible for the plaintiffs to conduct pre-discovery investigation whether misrepresentations have been made in an offering document actually drafted what actually drafted what actually drafted whether only to Advest and the individual defendants who signed determines that there are not sufficient allegations to determine whether the defendant held liable as a primary violator, it should allow the Plaintiffs held liable as a primary violator.



2. Plaintiffs Have Stated Causes of Action Against Officer Defendants

TheThe Bradford Defendants do not contest the Plaintiffs' ability to tie the Officer Defendants, ShortShort andShort and KiszShort and Kiszka, to the misrepresentations and omissions in the Official Statement. Short,Short, after all, signed the appendix to theShort, after all, signed the appendix to the Official Statement concerning the alleged incident. TheThe BradfordThe Bradford Defendants, however, do contest whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently allegedThe B with regard to these individuals.

As the two senior officers of the College, Short and Kiszka, had access to the reports and data which contradicted the Official Statement's projections regarding enrollment and financial aid. AC, ¶ 34.<sup>35</sup> Kiszka, a senior officer, initiated and circulated the budgets that contradicted the financial information. AC, ¶ 57. Kiszka also had access to the data that belied the Official Statement's predictions regarding the current enrollment and financial aid. AC, ¶ 57. Kiszka also had access to the admissions data that contradicted the Official Statement's predictions. Similarly, the admissions data that contradicted the Official Statement's predictions were routinely generated by the school's admissions office and were circulated to the President and the CFO.

The President and CFO would also know whether or not a student  
Bradford. Indeed, the dire situation was disclosed in  
himself was the one who predicted only two to three more years for the  
would have both known of the non-existence of the financial aid reduction  
strategic plan. With regard to the Board decision to use all efforts to avoid making

35 ToTo the extent such allegations pled with sufficient specificity in the current complaint, tTo the extent such a  
detailed by an amended pleading.

contradiction, contribution, Short attended the meeting where this policy was decided. AC, ¶ 65. Although alleged in the Amended Complaint, the minutes of the Board Com alleged in the Amended Complaint. Bradford Defendants have attached as Exhibit Bradford Defendants have attached as Exhibit 2 to their support. was also present and made the financial presentation to the Committee members.<sup>36</sup>

In short, the Plaintiffs have alleged, or can easily amend to allege, that Short and the Trustees had knowledge of all of the material facts that were either known or should have been known by them when they signed the Bradford appendix contained within the Official Statement. They failed to check the records and information they possessed and misrepresented them. Combined with the other circumstances described above, these facts are sufficient to raise a strong inference of liability against the two defendants.

### 3. The Trustee Defendants May Be Found Liable for the Bradford Defendants' Misrepresentation

The Bradford Defendants correctly state that the Plaintiffs have not pled specific facts to connect any of the Trustee Defendants to the misrepresentation in the Official Statement<sup>37</sup>. Although many of the Trustees had knowledge regarding the contested issues, although many of the Trustees did not sign the Official Statement, and without discovery the Plaintiffs cannot allege the roles the individual Trustee Defendants had in drafting, preparing and approving it.

The Trustee Defendants, however, are still liable to the Plaintiffs.

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<sup>36</sup> Kiszka, in fact, appears to have drafted the minutes of the Committee meetings, since Kiszka, in fact, appears to have signed at the bottom of the document.

<sup>37</sup> Plaintiffs do not consider Defendant Short to be a Trustee. Although Short sat on the board of trustees, he was also the President. He signed the disclosure and most certainly can be considered responsible for its contents.

§§ 20(a). To establish a §20(a) claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that a defendant controlled the violator; and (2) that a defendant controlled the violator. Garvey v Arkoosh, 354 F. Supp. 2d 73, 85 (2005). The Complaint clearly depicts Rule 10b-5 violations by Bradford, the entity the Trustee Defendants have filed for bankruptcy and is not a party to action is immaterial. See WorldCom Inc. Securities Litigation, 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). § 20(a) claim against Director Defendants based on their control of WorldCom that WorldCom was not a defendant in action.) .

The Bradford Defendants also allege that the Bradford Defendants also allege that the Bradford Defendants control over Bradford. The Bradford Defendants forget, however, that the Bradford Defendants pleading standards do not apply to § 20 claims. In re WorldCom Inc. Securities Litigation, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 415-16. Liability under § 20 is not premised on the defendant's statement or material omission, or having acted with a particular state of mind. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) apply. Moreover, the First Circuit has recognized that (c)ontrol is a question of fact that will not ordinarily be resolved by summary judgment. F.3d 11, 41 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiffs control claims against the Bradford Defendants survive if the Amended Complaint alleges that they exercise control over WorldCom with Rule 8(a). The Amended Complaint meets this showing.

The Amended Complaint states (as does the Official Complaint) that the Bradford Defendants, by the Trustee Defendants. AC, ¶ 40. It also alleges that the Bradford Defendants, by the Trustee Defendants, controlled the management and activities of the College, AC, ¶ 37, the management and activities of the College, AC, ¶ 37.



did indeed direct the management of Bradford.<sup>38</sup> It further state It further states It further states that drafting, drafting, prepdrafting, preparation drafting, preparation and/or approval of the Official Statement and disregarded the misrepresentations and material omissions contained in the Official Statement. The Board had the authority to exercise control over the College, including the activities that exercise control over the College, including this stage of the proceeding, that is all that is required.<sup>39</sup>

## II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED A CLAIM AGAINST ADVEST UNDER SECTION 12 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.

- A. Plain Plaintiff's Interest In Bradford's Contract To Repay The Bond Debt Is A Security That Is Not Exempt From The Antifraud Provisions of the 1933 Act.
1. The agreement of a beneficiary of conduit financing for a municipal bond offering is a separate security which may be subject to the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act.

Count III, which Plaintiffs have brought against Advest alone, alleges that Advest sold the bonds to them through the use of a prospectus that contained untrue statements of material fact and material omissions in violation of § 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). Advest's principal defense is that the bond offering was exempt from Section 12. Exempt securities laws are narrowly construed and Advest bears the burden of proving exemption. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).

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<sup>38</sup> See e.g., ¶¶ 47, 51 (attempting to engage in financial planning), ¶ 50 (approving dormitory construction project), ¶¶ 57, 69 (reviewing and approving Bradford's budget), ¶ 65 (deciding to not make a renovation project), ¶ 72 (deciding to continue with renovations and to expand), ¶ 73 (refusing to liquidate Bradford regardless of bleak financial future).

<sup>39</sup> There can be no doubt that Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants, who are plainly alleged to have had and exercised control over the College, including this stage of the proceeding, that is all that is required.

Section 3(a) of the 1933 Act exempts several categories of the Act's provisions. Pursuant to subsection (4), any security issued by a person of the Act's provisions operated exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes and not for pecuniary profit is exempt. The subsection purpose from the registration requirements of the Act covers all securities whether or not exempted, except as provided in subsection (14) of §3(a). Only if the Bradford bonds qualify under these later exclusions is Adviser exempt from Section 12 liability.

[illegible]

If the private parties who are the beneficiaries of conduit financing are exempt from registration and antifraud provisions of the securities laws, § 3(a)(2), substantial danger exists for investors. The SEC recognized the potential for abuse as far back as 1968, when it promulgated Rule 131, 15 CFR § 240.131-1. In its position that more than one security is offered and its position that more than one security is offered and its position that more than one security is offered

the underlying agreement by the private entity that received the proceeds of a conduit financing to repay those monies was a separate security distinct from the company. Recognizing that the typical conduit financing arrangement represents a financing company, it analyzed the situation as follows:

The municipality of other governmental units usual obligation under the bond, except to the extent received from the private company to the municipality. The investor cannot look to the municipality for interest payments or repayment of the principal; he can only look to the private company. The municipality serves as a guarantor of the private company's performance under the lease agreement. The amounts payable under the lease agreement are payable to the bondholder. In these circumstances, the investor is offered an interest in an obligation secured by a security within the meaning of the securities benefit of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when applicable. (emphasis added)

Industrial Revenue Bonds, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FR 3142-43, 3144 (Comm., Feb. 16, 1968). The SEC has also recognized that there are two issuers in conduit financings, the official government entity and the private company. e.g. 15 CFR 240.15c2-12(f)(4) (issuer of municipal securities defined as governmental entity specified in section 3(a)(29) of the Act and the issuer of any separate security specified in section 3(a)(29) of the Act). It follows that if the separate security is not exempt from registration, it is involved in the offering and must meet the requirements of the Act. Industrial Revenue Bonds, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FR at 3142-43.

Courts, commentators and even Congress have accepted the existence of two securities in conduit financing transactions. See, McCay v. Juran, 1998 WL 1780694 \*5 (D. N.D., 1998) (finding a separate non-exempt security in a conduit financing transaction).

financing for purposes of North Dakota Blue Sky lawsfinancing for purposes of North Dakota Blue Sky laws  
Regulation, sec. 4.3[A][1] (, sec. 4.3[A][1] (5th e, sec. 4.3[A][1] (5th ed., 2005); Louis Loss and Joel S  
Securities Regulation, pp. 268-72 (3d ed. 1995). The most concrete, pp. 268-72 (3d ed. 1995). The mos  
 aa separate securitya separate security in conduit financing is the action taken by Congress when it decided, against  
 SEC sSEC s wishes, to not require registration of many ofSEC s wishes, to not require registration of many of the b  
 InsteadInstead of amending the§ 2(1) definition of security to clarifyInstead of amending the§ 2(1) definition of  
 oror were or were not securor were not securities under the 1933 Act,<sup>40</sup> in 1970 it expanded the exemption u  
 specificallyspecifically exempting any security which is an industrial development bond that bears interest  
 thatthat is excludable from gross income under spethat is excludable from gross income under specithat is ex  
 Code. See Pub.L. 91-373, Title IV, §401(a).<sup>41</sup>

PlaiPlainly,Plainly, if Congress intended alPlainly, if Congress intended all securities issued b  
 automatautomaticallyautomatically exempt from the 1933 Act, it would not have amended the statute to speci  
 exemptexempt cerexempt certain types of conduit financing issues; the existing form of the statute would e  
 providedprovided suchprovided such an exemption. Congress action implicitly recognizes that someprovided su  
 sesecuritiessecurities are not exempt, even when a body politic of a state has formally issued the ssecurities a  
 FurtFurther,Further, there must be some significance that Congress did not exempt all types of tax-exempFur  
 municipalmunicipal securities permitted by the tax code, but omunicipal securities permitted by the tax code, b  
 bonds.

AdvestAdvest contendsAdvest contends that only those types of conduit financings directly within the scop

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<sup>40</sup> ContrastContrast Pub.L. 10Contrast Pub.L. 105-5Contrast Pub.L. 105-554 § 1(a)(5) which deleted non-security b  
 definitiondefinition of security in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through thdefinition of security in Securities Exchange  
 CongressionalCongressional action,Congressional action, which was also taken in response to a regulatory position that Congress disap  
 Congress will clarify the definition of security if it believes a regulatory agency has incorrectly interpreted it.

<sup>41</sup> The actual text of the provision is set forth in footnote 45, infra.

131,131, which is 131, which is limited to financing for the benefit of an industrial  
create separate securities. It asserts that if the Bradford offering did not fall within Rule 131, no non-  
exempt separate security exists. Advest misinterprets the SEC's powers. While the SEC has some discretion to define what type  
of security it does not have the ability to create a security. it does not have the ability to create a security. it does not  
understand a security to exist under the 1933 Act. A debt instrument falls within the definition, whether the SEC acknowledges it or not.  
If a debt instrument falls within the definition, whether the SEC acknowledges it or not, it must comply with the Act's requirements.

Thus, merely because the SEC did not include conduit entities within the scope of Rule 131 does not mean separate securities within the scope of Rule 131 do not exist. Revenue bond financings.<sup>42</sup> If separate securities exist in conduit financings, the issuer, if not a state or municipal entity, stands behind the ultimate payment, and the treatment of the offering is determined by the industry and other provisions. There is no reason under the securities laws why one type of conduit financing, but not another.

This is borne out by McKay v. Juran & Moody, Inc., 1998 WL 1780694 \*5 (D. 1998 WL 1780694 \*5), which involved a North Dakota Blue Sky Act claim<sup>43</sup> for failing to register certificates of participation in lease agreements that defendants sold.

<sup>42</sup> There is a reason why the SEC only included industrial revenue bonds and not municipal bond conduit financings involving non-profit entities. To require the private entities profiting from industrial revenue bonds to require the private entities profiting from Bradford, Bradford, and other educational, benevolent and non-profit entities, however, are exempt from §3(a)(4). There is no reason to include them within the scope of Rule §3(a)(4). There is no reason to include the expanded, such entities, unlike private for profit companies, would be exempt from registration in any event.

43 TheThe plaintiff s federal securities claims were dismissed on stThe plaintiff s federal securities claims were dismissed  
1780694 \*3.

issued by North Dakota counties, and defendants, like Advest here, claimed they qualified issued by North Dakota  
statutory exemption for securities issued by a state statutory exemption for securities issued by a state  
were similar, but distinct, from revenue bonds, and the municipal issuer's  
responsibility for their payment. The District Court examined Rule 131, responsibility for their payment  
of Rule 131 apply in this case, even though the certificate of Rule 131 a  
It found that there were two separate securities, one issued by the  
party responsible for repayment. Because the later was  
exempt.

The same result applies here. The Bradford bonds comprised MIFA, and the second, which contained the College's promise of MIFA, and the second, which contained the College's promise of MIFA. Because Bradford is exempt from registration as an educational entity, the Bonds do not need to be registered. But because entities qualifying for the subsection (4) exemption from Section 12, Advest can be held liable for any misstatements in any prospectus pursuant to which the securities were sold.

2. Neither the structure of exemptions permitted under the purpose of the governmental issued security exemption.

AdvestAdvest claims that the tax exempt status of bond issuaAdvest claims that the tax exempt status exemption.exemption. While Congexemption. While Congress exemption. While Congress did expand the developmentdevelopment bonds in 1970, there is no doubt that the Brdevelopment bonds in 1970, there is

<sup>44</sup> AlthoughAlthough not expressly stated, theAlthough not expressly stated, the financing wouldAlthough not expressly  
of the certificates of participation was tooof the certificates of participation was to fund the constructionof the certificates of participation.  
Indeed,Indeed, Rule 131 could not apply under any circumstances since the violation alleged wIndeed, Rule 131 could not apply unde  
NorthNorth Dakota s securities law s. Rule 13 1,eNorth Dakota s securities laws. Rule 131, evNorth Dakota s securities laws. Rule 131, ever  
NorNor does it purport to iden tify what constitutes a security under state securities statutes. Nor does it purport to iden tify what constitute  
to have had a state equivalent of Rule 131.

exemptions exemptions parameters,<sup>45</sup> the bonds are not industrial revenue bonds the bonds are not industrial revenue bonds  
their behalf excluded from gross income on account of the specific tax code provision their behalf excluded from gross income on account of the specific tax code provision  
statute.<sup>46</sup> Nor can Advest claim Congress intended Nor can Advest claim Congress intended Nor can Advest claim Congress intended  
Congress Congress passed only a narrow exemption in 1970. If Congress intended to exempt all conduit financings financings that benefited tax exempt entities such as Bradford, it would have  
exemption exemption or amended Section 12 so it no longer applied to securities sold by the institution exemption exemption or amended Section 12 so it no longer applied to securities sold by the institution  
(4) and (14) of §3(a), instead of just (2) and (14). By granting institutions such (4) and (14) of §3(a), instead of just (2) and (14). By granting institutions such  
exemption exemption from registration, Congress clearly did not intend exemption from registration, Congress clearly did not intend exemption from registration, Congress clearly did not intend  
institutions enjoy a broad exemption from the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act.

Advest strongly relies on Judge Zobel's opinion in 77497749, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 93,173 (D. Mass. 1987) and two other cases In re Bexar County Facility Development Corp. Sec. Litigation, 125 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1, 125 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1990), Cambridge Partners, LLC 2003 WL 229921, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 92,650. These cases merely focus on whether the debt instrument at issue fell within Rule 131. on whether the debt instrument at issue fell within whether separate securities exist in the conduit financings regardless of the literal applicability of Rule 131. Rule 131. Indeed Bexar County purports to require proof that Congress intended to exempt entities of their purported exemption from Section 12's antifraud provision. Thentities of their purported

<sup>45</sup> The 1970 amendment to subsection (2) expanded the exemption of industrial development bonds (as defined in section 103(a)(1) of Title 26) from income tax if, by reason of the application of paragraph (4) of Title 26 (determined as if paragraphs (4)(A), (5), and (7) were not included), such section 103(c) does not apply to such security.

<sup>46</sup> In any event, it appears that this exemption is no longer available. When Congress overhauled the Internal Revenue Code in 1986 it completely overhauled the development bonds provisions of the Code, and the specific statutes that previously provided for the exemption no longer exist. If necessary for qualification of the exemption, Congress must be presumed to have eliminated the exemption.

ignoresignores Congress ignores Congress clear mandate that charitable and educational entities should only be ex  
 thethe 1933 Act s registration provisions because Congress the 1933 Act s registration provisions because Congress  
 securities from Section 12.

Finally,Finally, the CourFinally, the Court must coFinally, the Court must consider whether expa  
 exemptionexemption to cover theexemption to cover the types of private entities Congress deliberately chose not to  
 isis consistent with the policies of the federal securities laws. This consistent with the policies of the federal se  
AlloydAlloyd Company, 513, 513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995) has already cautioned against interpreting §3(a)(2) to  
 illogically allow this exemption to be enjoyed by private entities.

WhyWhy would Congress grant immunity to aWhy would Congress grant immunity to a pWhy  
 recissionrecission suit for no reason otherrecission suit for no reason other than that the seller speci  
 toto relate to securities issued by a government entity?to relate to securities issued by a governmen  
 TheThe anomaly disappears, however, when theThe anomaly disappears, however, when the term  
 toto documents that offer to documents that offer securities to documents that offer securities  
 eexemptionexemption for government-issued securities makes perfect sense on that  
 viewview, view, for it then becomes a precise and appropriate means of giving  
 immunity to governmental authorities.

PermittingPermitting the government-issued security exempPermitting the government-issued security ex  
 underwritersunderwriters does not serve the precise and appropriunderwriters does not serve the precise and ap  
 itit clearit clear that §3(a)(2) is designed to protect true government financings. Applying the exemption to  
 aa private party Congress did not ora private party Congress did not origia private party Congress did not o  
 unnecessarilyunnecessarily expands an exemption that is supposed to be construed narrowly to effectuate its  
 purpose.



B. Plaintiffs Have Properly Pled The Elements of a Section 12(a)(2) Claim

1. Rule 9(b) Pleading Standards Do Not Apply To This Count

Fraud is not an element of a Section 12 claim and Plaintiffs are not required to prove scienter or reliance. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 582 (1995); Consequently, Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standards do not apply to a Section 12 claim that sounds in fraud. Section 12 claims that sound in fraud. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223. Nor do claims based on negligent misstatements. Number Nine, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 13.

Here, in contrast to Plaintiff's Rule 10b-5, fraud and negligent misstatements. Plaintiffs do not allege that they relied on the fraud. ¶¶ 92 with AC, ¶¶ 85, 97 and 100. Also, in contrast to their Rule 10b-5 and fraud, Plaintiffs only allege negligent conduct in Count III as opposed to only allege negligent conduct in Counts I and II. Compare AC, ¶ 90 with AC, ¶¶ 83, 97. Accordingly the Amended Complaint sounds in fraud and Rule 8 pleading rules apply to this claim.<sup>48</sup>

2. Plaintiffs have appropriately pled that Plaintiffs have appropriately pled that

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<sup>47</sup> Plaintiffs do alternatively plead that Advest knew about the false statements but such an allegation does not convert their claim into one which sounds in fraud.

Although the complaint does assert that defendants actually possessed the information that they failed to disclose, those allegations cannot be thought to constitute averments that they failed to disclose, those allegations absent any claim of scienter and reliance. Otherwise, any alleged material information would be transformed into a material information under Rule 9(b).

Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223. See also Number Nine, 51 F. Supp.2d at 13.

<sup>48</sup> Advest asserts that because the Plaintiffs are pleading the same misstatements and omissions under their Rule 10b-5 and Section 12 claims, the latter necessarily sound in fraud. However, to conserve judicial resources and to avoid duplicative actions, the same misstatements and omissions are not pleaded under both. However, the Plaintiffs may not submit any evidence that conduct was done knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for conduct was done knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard.

materially false statements and misleading material omissions.

Advest correctly states that the same misrepresentations and omissions that constitute the same Rule 10b-5 claims, are also the misstatements and omissions that constitute the same Section 12 claim. For the reason set forth in Section I, the Plaintiffs' allegations to state a claim under the most stringent standard. Consequently, they meet the rigorous Rule 8 standard that applies to this claim. The Plaintiffs do not need to add anything further.

### 3. Plaintiffs have standing as purchasers in the initial offering

Plaintiffs have alleged that they purchased their holdings in the primary offering and not in the secondary market. Especially from the size of the positions taken by the Institutional Bondholders, that Plaintiffs purchased their holdings in the primary offering and not in the secondary market is not a reasonable inference, Plaintiffs, all of whom are initial purchasers, can amend their complaint to repair this technical error.

## **III. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED VIABLE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR THE REMAINING STATE LAW COUNTS**

The Amended Complaint includes five claims under Massachusetts Law: violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act, M.G.L. c. 110, § 410; violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act; misrepresentation; and breach of fiduciary duty to creditors. The Amended Complaint includes five claims under Massachusetts Law: violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act, M.G.L. c. 110, § 410; violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act; misrepresentation; and breach of fiduciary duty to creditors. The Amended Complaint includes five claims under Massachusetts Law: violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act, M.G.L. c. 110, § 410; violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act; misrepresentation; and breach of fiduciary duty to creditors. The Amended Complaint includes five claims under Massachusetts Law: violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act, M.G.L. c. 110, § 410; violation of Chapter 93A; Uniform Securities Act; misrepresentation; and breach of fiduciary duty to creditors.

A. Plaintiffs Have Stated Claims Against All Defendants For Violations of the Massachusetts Securities Act

The Massachusetts version of the Uniform Securities Act, which is contained in the Uniform Securities Act, securities offerings in the Commonwealth, but contains only misrepresentations and omissions, § 410. Marram v. K 50, 809 N.E. 2d 1017, 1025 (2004) ( Marram ). Section 410(a)(2) provides a cause of action against any person that offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement or any omission of a material fact. Section 410(b) also provides liability for

Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable. Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller, every partner, officer, or director of a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale, severally with and to the same extent as the seller. . .

The Amended Complaint alleges that Bradford and Advest are liable under subsection (b). Plaintiffs seek to hold the Bradford Defendants, as officers, directors and control persons of Bradford, liable under subsection (b).

1. The Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act Applies To An Offering of Securities

All Defendants contest the Plaintiffs' standing to bring claims under Ch. 110A. The complaint does not allege where the bonds were sold. The statute, however, is not correctly stated by the Defendants. Section 414(a) states that § 410 applies to persons who sell or offer to sell when the sale is made in the commonwealth, or (2) an offer to buy is made and is made in the commonwealth. Subsections (c) and (d) elaborate when these conditions have been met. Subsection (c) states:

For the purpose of this section, an offer to sell or an offer to buy

commonwealth, whether or not either par  
commonwealth, when the offer (1) originates from the comm  
is directed by the offeror is directed by the offeror to the commonwealth and reco  
which it is directed. . .

The Amended Complaint specifically alleges that Bradford, state offices, offered the securities to the Plaintiffs. state offices, offered the  
Bradford s offer originated in the Commonwealth, Bradford s offer originated in th  
aa security be made in the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is inconceivable that aa security be made in the Comm  
Massachusetts state agency on behalf of a Massachusetts educational institution  
to originate in Massachusetts. Where the Plaintiffs were located and whether Advest sold the  
securities from their main office in Hartford  
specifically states that the presence of the buyers or the sellers in  
offer or sale is unnecessary.

2. The Bradford Defendants cannot escape liability as the  
of the entity that issued a misleading Off  
Advest underwrote a firm commitment bond offering.

Section 410(b) establishes broad secondary liability for fi  
specified relationships with a primary violator. However, specifie  
seller for such liability to arise; the statute does not impose liability  
or broker/dealers of §410(a)(2) violators who only offer a security. Relying or broker/dealers o  
authority, the Bradford Defendants argue that only Advest, the under  
seller and, consequently, they must be dismissed.

The Bradford Defendants argument arises out of Pinter v. Dahl, 4  
aa United States Supreme Court decision interpreting a United S  
1933 Act. The Court ruled that sellers are limited to

plaintiff and any other person who successfully solicited the plaintiff's purchase of securities provided the solicitor was motivated at least in part by a desire to provide the security owner or those of the security owner. Id. The Court specifically rejected an alternative seller, adopted seller, adopted by numerous lower courts, that would also hold liable a substantial factor in causing the transaction to occur. Id. at 648-51.

In Shaw, the First Circuit, the First Circuit examined the effect of Pinter in a firm in a firm commitment u  
suchsuch as the one alleged in the Amended Complaint, in a Section 1such as the one alleged in the Amended C  
WhereWhere the underwriter purchaseWhere the underwriter purchases the entire iWhere the underwriter pur  
underwriterunderwriter is the person who has transferred title to the purchaser. Accordinunderwriter is the pers  
thethe issuer and its officers, notwithsthe issuer and its officers, notwithstanding any the issuer and its offic  
statementsstatements in the prospectus, are notstatements in the prospectus, are not liable unlessstatements in the  
Id. at at 1216. Such solicitation, the Court found, does not occur when the at 1216. Such solicitation, the Court four  
to to it participate in the preparation of the prto it participate in the preparation of the prosto it participate  
securitiessecurities offering. Id. There must be factu There must be factual alleg There must be factual all  
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id.

TheThe mechanical applicationThe mechanical application of theThe mechanical application of the definition of the issuer of the securities as the elevation of form over substance. For no valid reason, an issuer and his officers and directors can be held liable for Section 12 violations in a best-efforts underwriting. The underwriter effectively acts as the issuer's agent but has no liability, despite the underwriter's representation for the contents of the prospectus, in a firm commitment underwriting. 3B Securities and Federal Corporate Law (2d. Ed. 2004), § 3.04[1]. This senseless result can be carried over to the Uniform Securities Act. But the structure of the

Act is significantly different than the 1933 Act, and the purpose of the Act is to protect investors from the unthinking adoption of federal precedent. Moreover, there is evidence that the Uniform Act did not intend issuers and their counsel to be bound by the circumstances. Not surprisingly, therefore, the sole state Supreme Court to have addressed whether an issuer responsible for a misleading offering under the Uniform Securities Act has rejected the result the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would likely reach were it faced with the issue. For the reasons set forth below, the Institutional Bondholders can rely on the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in *Bradford* with regard to this offering.

- a. The Uniform Securities Act did not intend in public offerings and in public offerings and the purposes of the civil liability provisions.

The purpose of §410(a)(2) is to create a strong incentive for sellers of securities to disclose fully all material facts about the security. Marram, 442 Mass at 51, 809 N.E. 2d at 102, allowing rescission without proof of scienter, provides a heightened deterrent to prevent misrepresentations. provides a heightened deterrent to prevent misrepresentations. furthers this deterrent effect by imposing joint and several personal liability on persons, officers, directors, partners, and all persons having a similar status or fulfilling a similar function, as well as those employees who materially aided in the sale. If the seller employs a broker/dealer or other agent to aid in the sale, the agent is also liable if he materially aided in the sale.

In a public offering where the issuer is the seller, this circle of secondary liability

eminent sense. These control persons, employees and agents are generally the persons responsible for the offering memorandum that is required in public offerings. Liability provides the incentive to assure the complete and accurate disclosure of the statute, regardless of the solvency or financial condition of the issuer.

Secondary liability, however, is distributed irrationally in public offerings where an underwriter is deemed to be the sole seller. Liability is no longer coterminous with the underwriter. In a firm commitment offering managed by an underwriter, the officers and directors of the underwriter would be able to influence the accuracy of the offering, much less insure their accuracy. Liability because high level executives of a sizable underwriter do not qualify for the reasonable care defense provided by the liability of a broker/dealer makes no sense. The liability of a broker/dealer makes no sense. The liability of a broker/dealer makes no sense. At the same time, the persons who have the most culpability for misstatements in the prospectus, those affiliated with the issuer, have no liability, not even as an aider or abettor. When seller is too narrowly construed, many of the incentives for accurate disclosure are lost, while much of the remaining liability is ineffective or serve no purpose.

Due to the different structure of the Securities Act, the definition of seller does not create anomalous results. Unlike the Uniform Act, the Securities Act has two primary provisions: one for sellers who make false statements (§12, 15 U.S.C. § 77l) and a second one for sellers who

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<sup>49</sup> It is precisely for this reason Plaintiffs have not named the officers and directors of the issuer as technically viable claims against them exist.

aa false registration statement (§a false registration statement (§ 11, 15 U.S.C. §a false registration statement (§ 11, 19331933 Act,1933 Act, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o, reaches both violations.1933 Act, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o, reach eveneven if the officers and directors of the issuer cannot be held even if the officers and directors of the prospectusprospectus as the control person of a prospectus as the control person of a Sectprospectus as responsibilityresponsibility for such statemenresponsibility for such statements becauseresponsibility for misrepresentationsmisrepresentations in a registmisrepresentations in a registrationmisrepresentations in a registration anan incentive to provide accurate disclosures toan incentive to provide accurate disclosures to the persons who l thethe Uniform Act, however, has a single civil liability provision, narrowing the definition of seller confounds the incentives of the Act.

GivenGiven this background, it is not surprising that there is evidence that the drafters of the UniformUniform Securities Act did nUniform Securities Act did not intend issUniform Securities Act did not MassachusettsMassachusetts adopted the Uniform Securities Act in 1972, and it was promulgatedMassachusetts a LawsCommission in 1956,Laws Commission in 1956, decades before the SupremeLaws Commission in 195 definitiondefinition definition of seller. Although the commentary to the 1956 draft of the Uniform Act doe addressaddress who should be deemed a seller under §410(a)(2), comments to the 1985 revision address who UnifoUniformUniform Act indicate that issuers should be sellers under the Uniform Act s civil liabilityU provisions.

TheThe 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act restructured the priorThe 1985 revision of the Unif TheThe prohibition against selling The prohibition against selling a securitThe prohibition against selling a se movedmoved to §501(2) and the private rmoved to §501(2) and the private rightmoved to §501(2) and the However,However, theHowever, the civil liability provisions, with one exception notHowever, the civil liability



bebe substantively changed by the revisions.<sup>50</sup> Section 605 (a), the primary vi Section 605 (a), the primary  
 continuedcontinued to impose liability on a person who offers to sellcontinued to impose liability on a person who  
 22 to §605 plainly stated tha2 to §605 plainly stated that2 to §605 plainly stated that seller s liability under  
 includedincluded persons whose participation wincluded persons whose participation was a sincluded person  
 definition that would clearly cover issuers who published false prospectuses:

SectionSection 501(2) follows closely Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933  
 whichwhich imposes liability for material misrepresentatwhich imposes liability for material mis  
 disclosuresdisclosures given to buyers. *AsAs inAs in the case with the latter, liability may be*  
*imposedimposed on a person in addition to the immediate seller if the person s*  
*participationparticipation was a substantial contributiveparticipation was a substantial contributi*  
Davis v. Avco Financial, 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984)(emphasis added).

Indeed,Indeed, to confirm that officers andIndeed, to confirm that officers and directors ofIndeed, to confirm that of  
 thethe secondary liability provision, § 605(d),<sup>52</sup> no longer no longer limited no longer limited the liability of contro  
 andand directors to persons who were related to a violating seller. Section 605(and directors to persons who w  
 personperson related to a violator of Section (a) is liable, regardless operson related to a violator of Section (a)

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<sup>50</sup> CommentComment 1 to §605 of the 1985 revision Comment 1 to §605 of the 1985 revision stateComment 1 to  
 exception of subsection (c)[relating to market manipulation], is not intended to alter significantly existing law.

<sup>51</sup> Section 605(a) of the 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act states in relevant part:

AA person who offers to sell or sells a security in violation of Section 501(s) .A person who offers to sell or sells a se  
 one who purchases the security from that person.

<sup>52</sup> Section 605(s) of the 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act states in relevant part:

A personA person who directlyA person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsec  
 (a)(a) or (c), a partner, officer, or director of the person liable, a person occupying a(a) or (c), a partner, officer, or  
 statusstatus or performing similar functions, an emstatus or performing similar functions, an empstatus or perfor  
 mamaterialmateriallymaterially aids in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation, and a broker-  
 dealerdealer of sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission, or transaction  
 constitutingconstituting the violation, are also liableconstituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with  
 the other person . . .

merely offered to sell.<sup>553</sup> This clarification confirms liability of individuals in the Bradford Defendants position in a firm commitment underwriting when the prDefendants position misrepresentations.

Plaintiffs, of course, recognize that Massachusetts has not adopted Plaintiffs, of course, recognize UUniform Securities Act. However, when the drafters of a statute adopted by the MUniform Securities Legislature clarify what they intended when Legislature clarify what they intended when the original statute is entitled to weight in construing the statute. Cf. Kale v. Combined Insurance Co., 861 F.2d 746, 752, n.7 (subsequent legislative statements are entitled to interpret intent of original body is unclear).

Plaintiffs have been able to only find one court in a Plaintiffs have been able to only find one court in Securities Act that has squarely addressed the issue of who is a seller in a firm commitment underwriting, and that Court has repeatedly ruled that the purposes of the issuer is recognized as a seller. The Supreme Court in Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply System aa bondholders suit arising out of the infamous Washington Public Power Supply System ( WPPSS ) default in the mid 1980s. The state of Washington that had issued bonds to construct plants far exceeded original estimates and the agency defaulted on bonds shortly after construction of the plants. Bondholders brought suit under the civil liability provision of Washington

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<sup>53</sup> The Bradford Defendants have practically conceded that if § 410(b) liability extended to officers and directors of a violator of subsection (a)(2), as opposed to only a seller who has violated subsection (b), they are persons who could be found liable under subsection (b).

the Uniform Securities Act against the issuer and other persons who  
 in the sale of the bonds. The trial court dismissed the bondholders' claim on the ground that the  
 bonds were sold in a firm commitment underwriting and only the bonds  
 Washington's securities laws for selling the bonds to the plaintiffs.

Recognizing that Washington's Securities Act, the Washington Supreme Court surveyed the ap-  
 proach After reviewing the approach After  
 concluded that liability should attach when the defendant bringing about the transaction. 109 Wash 2d at  
 influenced by the Commentary to the 1985 Revision to the Uniform Securities Act cit-  
 It was particularly concerned that too narrow a definition would defeat the re-  
 statute in firm underwritten bond issue statute in firm underwritten b-  
 supported the remedial purposes of the Act.

The Court explained its ruling with the following:

Our substantial contributive factor analysis simply e-  
 approach to sellers so as to include those parties who have the attribute  
 a seller and thus who policy dictates should be a seller and thus who policy dictates should  
 RCW 21.20.430(1) [the RCW 21.20.430(1) [the RCW 21.20.430(1) [the Washington sta-  
 who would escape primary liability for want of privity.

Here, for example, the Supply System sold all the bonds to Here, for example, the Supply System  
 then sold them to plaintiffs and inter- then sold them to plaintiffs  
 privity for liability under RCW 21.20.430(1), or  
 potentially liable for prospectus fraud, cutting off all  
 the issuer of the bonds and others acting together the i-  
 the actual beneficiaries of the sale proceeds. The actual beneficiaries of the sale proceed-

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<sup>54</sup> The Court noted that the federal courts' interpretation of state law because the federal courts usually only repeated what their circuit had ruled with regard to interpreting the state enactment. 109 Wash 2d at 129, 744 P. 2d at 1051.

securities to insulate themselves from liability to ultimate purchasers by selling to middlemen beyond their control, by selling to middlemen beyond their control, know that the securities will be resold immediately to buyers on Official Statements and Annual Reports written by the issuer on Official Statements of the sales. Unlike the federal Securities Act of 1933, which provides for separate issuer liability. Thus, if privity were required under RCW 21.20.430(1), an issuer under RCW 21.20.430(1) would never be liable, regardless of its culpability, contrary to the clear purposes of the WSSA.

109 Wash 2d. at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052.

Haberman was decided before Pinter. After the Supreme Court's decision, the Washington Supreme Court had an opportunity to change its position in light of the Supreme Court's decision in v.v. Hoffer, 113 Wash 2d 148, 151-52, 776 P.2d 963, 964-65 (1989). The substantial contributive factor test was still the appropriate standard under the Securities Act in light of the Act's structure and policies. The Court gave Pinter. First, the purpose of the state statute was different than the federal statute. The latter was also concerned with protecting investors and primarily was concerned with protecting investors. Second, the structure of the two statutes are different. While the federal statute had a separate provision for liability for issuers (§ 11), the Uniform Securities Act did not. Third, the Court returned to the problem of firm commitment underwritings. The Legislature would insulate issuers from liability when and reports that were critical in informing investors. Id. 113 Wash 2d at 152, 776 P. 2d at 965.

The concerns of the Washington Supreme Court in HabermHaberman and Hoffer, and their understanding of the purposes of the Uniform Securities Act, are same understanding of the purposes of the Uniform Securities Act, as the Supreme Judicial Court demonstrated in its analysis of the Uniform Securities Act.

The SJC has clearly stated its view that the Act is redressive andThe SJC has clearly stated its view that the  
to provide substantial protection to the buyerto provide substantial protection to the buyer of secto provi  
information.information. information. 442 Mass. at 51-52, 809 N.E. 2dinformation. 442 Mass. at 51-52, 809 N.E.  
investors,investors, it isinvestors, it is likely that the Court would recognizeinvestors, it is likely that the Court wo  
obtain the statute s objectives.

b. Some of the Plaintiffs were solicited by Bradford.

Even if the Court finds that seller should be defined in accordance with that does not necessarily mean that Bradford and its officers and that does not necessarily mean that §410. Persons that successfully solicited their own financial ends may be held liable as sellers. Pinter 486 U.S. at 687. Here, a currently alleged in the Amended Complaint, Kiszka, on behalf of Bradford, currently alleged in the Amended Complaint, at least one of the Institutional Bondholders before its purchase regarding at least one of the Institutional Bondbond issue. Such contact could be found to constitute solicitation and such contact would be sufficient to allow the § 410 claims against the Bradford Defendants to go forward. Ladies Investment Club v. Schlotzsky's, 90 F.3d 1001, 1004 (CA-3, 1997) (“The court in Ladies Investment Club v. Schlotzsky's considered whether issuer acted as underwriter’s agent in issuing securities without registration. The court concluded that the issuer’s solicitation by issuer in a firm underwriting issuance was not sufficient to establish that the issuer acted as underwriter’s agent for summary judgment). The Institutional Bondholders should be given leave to amend to allege solicitation.

3. Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim under the Uniform Securities Act.

Defendants' attack on the merits of Plaintiffs' Uniform Securities Act claim repeats the same assertions that the complaint fails to state the existence in the complaint of false or misleading statements or omissions. For the reasons set forth in the complaint, the statements identified in Section I do state claims for false and misleading statements identified in the complaint. It is unnecessary to repeat the analysis.

In evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' Uniform Securities Act claims, the court keeps in mind that plaintiffs are not required to plead negligence to state a claim under § 410. Marram, 442 Mass at 51-53, 809 N.E., 442 Mass at 51-53, 809 N.E. 2d at 1025-27 and Stolzoff v. Waste Systems International, Inc., 442 Mass. 747, 764, 792 N.E. 2d 1031, 1033 (1998). Further, because fraud is not an element of the statutory claim, Plaintiffs' failure to plead fraud with particularity does not violate the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). Stolzoff v. Waste Systems International, Inc., 442 Mass. 747, 764, 792 N.E. 2d 1031, 1033 (1998). The court therefore erroneously dismissed for failure to comply with Mass.R.Civ.P. 9(b)).

TheThe Bradford Defendants' assertion that estimates and projections cannot be the basisThe Bradford D claimclaim under § 410 is erroneous. The Supreme claim under § 410 is erroneous. The Supreme Judicial actionableactionable if it isactionable if it is inconsistent with factsactionable if it is inconsistent with facts knownat 58, 809 N.E. 2d at 1030 n. 24. Similarly incorrect is their assertion that general written disclaimersdisclaimers can overcome specific misrepresentations of fact. disclaimers can overcome specific misrep warningwarning that investment manager couldwarning that investment manager could concentrate holdings in o lawlaw refute plaintiff's claim that that defendant made specific misrepresentation concerning diversification).diversification). Indeed thediversification). Indeed the Court cited authority that alleged misrepres volatility ordinarily raise genuine issues of fact. Id. at 58, 809 N.E.2d at 1030.

#### 4. Plaintiffs Claims Are Not Precluded By A Statute of Repose

Astonishingly,Astonishingly, Astonishingly, theAstonishingly, the Astonishingly, the BradfordAstonishingly, the theythey they kthey knowingly signed to induce Plaintiffs to dismiss voluntarily their original timely actionPlaintiffs Uniform Security Act claims are barred by a statute of reposePlaintiffs Uniform Security Act claimastonishingastonishing fastonishing for at least two reasons: (1) § 410(e) is not a statute of repose, and (2) the Defendants are contractually bound not to raise the defense.

Statutes of repose completely eliminate a cause of action if the cause of action has accrued or been discovered. Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass 701, 708, 437 N.E.2d 1011 (1982). They commence from a definitely established date such as the date of the omission which forms the basis of the cause of action. Nissan Motor Co. v. Commissioner Of Revenue, 407 Mass 153, 158, 552 N.E.2d 84 (1990). A statute of repose is a bright line method of determining when the statutory period starts and a bright line method of obtaining certainty that potential liabilities are extinguished. Nett v. Nett, 412 Mass 617, 621-22, 591 N.E.2d 130, 137 (2002). A statute of limitations normally governs the time within which legal proceedings must be brought after the cause of action accrues. They ordinarily do not begin to run until the date of discovery. McGuinness v. Cotter, 412 Mass 617, 621-22, 591 N.E.2d 130, 137 (2002). Ordinarily, when the Legislature intends to create a statute of repose, it does so directly by language that unambiguously announces no exceptions to the statutory period. Id. 412 Mass at 622, 591 N.E.2d at 663.

Section 410(e), which provides that no person may sue for a violation o

than four years after its discovery than four years after its discovery does not creat

limitation period runs or a bright line which will enable a defendant to limitation period runs or a bright line which will enable a defendant to  
liability has been extinguished. liability has been extinguished. Indeed, commencement of liability has been extinguished. Indeed, commencement of  
discovery, discovery, which is a classic commencement of a normal limitations period. N discovery, which is a classic commencement of a normal limitations period.  
period tied to an act or omission by the defendant. Thus, it is hard to see how period tied to an act or omission by the defendant. Thus, it is hard to see how  
any defendant repose, since it any defendant repose, since it starts to run at any defendant repose, since it starts to run at  
(or even decades) after the event (or even decades) after the event in question. The language (or even decades) after the event (or even decades) after the event in question. The language  
unambiguous without exception finality that is unambiguous without exception finality that is  
the best evidence that § 410(e) is the best evidence that § 410(e) is a statute of limitation and not repose is that  
Court has described the four year term of § Court has described the four year term of § 410(e) as a limitation  
Marram, 442 Mass at 54, 809 N.E. 2d at 1028, and n. 20.

Even if § 410(e) was a statute of repose, it can be tolled, but whether it can be waived. Plaintiffs do not rely on its being tolled, but rather on Defendants' intentional waiver of their limitations or statute of repose defense based on the time covered by the TSCA. Defendants raise no reason why they could not legally waive another person's compliance with the Act's provisions of the statute cannot be waived.<sup>56</sup> Only a person acquiring a security interest in a product can waive another person's compliance with the Act's limitations period is as essential to the statutory scheme.

<sup>55</sup> ToTo the extent the Court cannot reasonably infeTo the extent the Court cannot reasonably infer To the extent th  
waivedwaived their rightwaived their rightswaived their rights waived their rights towaived their rights to waived their rights to raisewaived t

<sup>56</sup> Section 410(g) states that “any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder is void.”



non-waiver provision would also cover the protections the Act grants to security sellers.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, Finally, the Bradford Defendants Finally, the Bradford Defendants fail to inform from raising this argument. The Tolling and Standstill Agreements signed from Defendants state that

Each Potential Defendant hereby agrees and acknowledges that he or she shall not plead or raise and is estopped from pleading or raising the p time during the Tolling Period as part of a defense of bar time during the Tolling Period as Limitations Period with respect to any Claim. (emphasis added)

The Bradford Defendants do not explain why The Bradford Defendants do not explain why they were allowed to enjoy the valuable consideration they received for executing them. Plaintiffs allowed to enjoy of a timely filed law suit while the Plaintiffs should be wholly deprived of their bargain. The Court should not tolerate the Bradford Defendants bargain. The Court should not to with regard to this purported defense.

B. Plaintiffs Fraud Claims Plead Reliance Without Could Reasonably Rely on the Representations In Bradford's Official Statement

Defendants' arguments in favor of dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud claim their earlier assertions that the Amended Complaint fails to plead material misrepresentation and personal involvement of the individual defendants to the requisite required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Plaintiffs have addressed the Rule 10b-5 causes of action and there is no need to repeat the analysis.

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<sup>57</sup> In fact, the Bradford Defendants fail to cite any authority that statutes of repose in fact, the Bradford Defendants cannot be voluntarily waived. Undoubtedly, this is because the purpose of statutes of repose is to provide defendants the benefit of a date certain when liability will end, a reasonable expectation that they will not be called upon to resist an unreasonable expectation that they may be lost. *Nett v. Bellucci*, 437 Mass.630, 639, 774 N.E. 2d 130, 137 (2002). Protection of a statute of repose, particularly sophisticated litigation, expectation of repose and understand the risks taken by agreeing to such a protection, particularly if they are receiving valuable consideration in return.

In evaluating Plaintiffs' common law fraud claims, however, the Court should recall that although the circumstances of fraud must be pleaded with specificity under Rule 9(b), the heightened pleading standards for scienter and proof of common law fraud, the specificity requirement only extends to the particulars of the misleading statement. Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2004). It is satisfied when the complaint states the who, what, where and when of the fraudulent misrepresentation. Alternative Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2004). The other elements of fraud, such as intent and knowledge, are general terms. Rodi, 389 F.3d at 15.

All Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately pl

BondholderBondholder Plaintiffs however, have pled that the false statements in the Official Statement were made for the express purpose of inducing the Plaintiffs to purchase the bonds, AC,

they they did indeed purchase the bonds in reliance upon the Defendants' false statements.

AC, §§ 85, 97, 100 and that they would not have purchased the bonds if they had not been

AC, § 85. With regard to ACA, the Amended Complaint, AC, § 66, that its conversation with Kiszka reinforced the misleading statements in th

omissions, § 66, that the misleading statements in th

ACA to issue an insurance policy, §§ 97, 100 and that ACA relied

Official Statement (and in the conversation with Ki

Authority cited by the Defendants establishes that Authority

Beazer East, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 86 (D. Mass. 1998)(allegations of false representations, their agent reviewed the representations and that they then pur

in reliance upon representations adequately pleads reliance in conformity with Rule 9(b)).<sup>58</sup>

The Bradford Defendants contend that Plaintiffs could not reasonably have relied on the Official Statement and the financial results, they argue the warnings that Bradford might not be able to achieve its financial objectives make it unreasonable to rely on other information that might be incorrect or misleading. In essence, they argue that since the investors were warned of the potential risk, it is irrelevant if the Defendants concealed the investors were misstated facts that would have allowed Plaintiffs to evaluate the risks for themselves.

The First Circuit's recent decision in Rodi v. Southern New England School of  
3d 5, 14-17 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2004) makes short work of the Bradford Defendants' contentions. In Cir.  
plaintiff alleged that the Southern New plaintiff alleged that the Southern New plaintiff alleged that the Southern New  
prospect for ABA certification when he applied for admission and matriculated. The law

58 The cases cited by the Bradford Defendants clearly relate to situations not before the court. The cases cited by the Defendants, Lupron Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 295 F. Supp. 2d 148, 175 (D. Mass. 2003), there, 295 F. Supp. 2d 148, 175 (D. Mass. 2003), do not dispute that the plaintiffs either did not consult the fraudulent average wholesale price or knew it was inflated. Here, the Plaintiffs read the Official Statement and the Plaintiffs read the Official Statement and did not know that the Official Statement does not explicitly state that the Plaintiffs read the Official Statement, Plaintiffs are willing to amend.) does not explicitly state that the Plaintiffs read the Official Statement, Plaintiffs are willing to amend.) Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. D 194, 208 (D. Mass 2000), the, 122 F. Supp. D 194, 208 (D. Mass 2000), the specific promotional material that contained specific promotional material that contained misstatements sufficiently identified the false statements their fraud claims are based upon.

<sup>59</sup> TheThe Bradford Defendants breathless characterization of the OfficThe Bradford Defendants breathless character believebelieve that every page contained a black legend IMPENDING DOOM. They ignore thatbelieve that every page contained a investment investment grade. investment grade. They also ignore that the Official Statement investment grade. They also ignore inin eight years (400 to 550), the endowment had increased 204% in the same period and net assin eight years (400 to 550), the endow increasedincreased from \$11.9 million in 1994 to \$16.8 million inincreased from \$11.9 million in 1994 to \$16.8 million in 1997. Although for several years infor several years in a rowfor several years in a row the Official Statement also reveals that Bradford s alumni gave g companycompany that ran nine yearscompany y that ran nine years of defic its might likely be out of bus iness, the Bradford Defendants fail thatthat it is not uncommon for non-profit entities to routinelythat it is not uncommon for non-profit entities to routinely run optl contributions.contributions. contributions. If professionals as sophisticated as Standard & Poor s ratedcontributions. If professionals as s DefendantsDefendants can hardly argue that plaintiffs claims should be dismissed at the pleading stage because,asDefendants can hardly any investor who perused the Official Statement would obviously know this was a financial black hole.

claimed the former student could not reasonably rely on the representations because the school catalogue specifically disclaimed any representation that the school would beacatalogue specifically disclaimed prior to graduation. The law school argued that since the plaintiff prior to graduation. The law school argued promise of accreditation, and the disclaimer flatly contradicted any such promise, the promise was objectively unreasonable.

The First Circuit rejected such arguments:

This argument erects, and then attacks, a straw complaint alleging that the defendants falsely implied that they were accredited to achieve near-term accreditation. This is a meaningful distinction for an actor to demur when asked something for an actor to demur when it is quite another for an actor to mislead a person into believing it is quite another for an actor to possess means and abilities fully within its control. distinction, the defendant's distinction, the defendant's distinction as to whether the disclaimer does not cover the alleged misrepresentations, it cannot defeat them.

389 F.3d at 16

The parallel to this case is obvious. Here Defendants characterize Plaintiffs' flow of money flowing from the broken promise to repay the bonds or meet enrollment goals. Defendants claim that since Bradford warned that it might not be able to meet these goals, any reliance on that since Bradford's promises was unreasonable. But Plaintiffs do not complain that promises were unreasonable. But Plaintiffs' flow of money or class enrollments. They claim Defendants misrepresented and concealed flow of money or class enrollments' financial data that would have allowed them to realize financial data that would have allowed them to realize the bond debt, and that Bradford had objective information about the bond debt, and that Bradford had objective information disclosed objectives.

AA second ground in Rudi for denying the law school s for denying the law school s unreasonable reliance that that Massachusetts courts consistently have held that disclthat Massachusetts courts consistently have

fraudulent fraudulent misrepresentation claims. 379 F.3d at 17, citing Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 308 Mass. 1 N.E.2d 551, 558 (1941) and others. The Court recognized that policy that a party may not contract out of fraud, policy that a party may not contract out of fraud on an undeveloped record at the motion to dismiss on an undeveloped record at the motion to decision. 379 F.3d at 17. Indeed, decision. 379 F.3d at 17. Indeed, reliance argument relies were all decided on a full factual record at summary judgment or trial.<sup>60</sup>

Under Massachusetts law, reasonable reliance is on. See Roti, 389 F.3d at 16, Marram, 442 Mass. at 59-61, 809 N.E. 2d at 1031-32., 442 Mass. at 59-61, 809 N.E. 2d specifically cautions against granting such motions without a complete factual record. should follow those appellate courts' advice and deny Defendants' motion count.

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<sup>60</sup> None of the cases relied upon by the Bradford Plaintiffs are remotely analogous. All three involve alleged oral misrepresentations. In two of the cases, the representative plaintiff had either signed or was bound by. Sound Techniques, Inc. v. Hoffman, 50 Mass. App. 425, 737 N.E.2d 459 (2000) (lease contradicted oral representation); Kuwaiti Danish Computer Co. v. Digital Equipment Corp., 438 Mass. 459, 781 N.E. 2d 787 (2003) (price quotation contradicted oral representation). There is nothing inconsistent with the parts of the Official Statement on which the Plaintiffs rely. There is no promise that the goals will be met. had personal knowledge that the representation was false. Cote v. Astra, 1998). The Amended Complaint does not allege that any of the Plaintiffs had read the Official Statement.

- C. TheThe Bradford Defendants Responsible For the Misrepresentations In the Official StatementStatement CanStatement Can BeStatement Can Be Held Liable For Negligent Misrepresentation Bond Purchasers.

TheThe only argument unique to Defendants opposition to Plaintiffs neglThe only argu misrepresentationmisrepresentation count is the Bradford Defendants assertion thatmisrepresentation count is the purchaserspurchasers for a failure topurchasers for a failure to use reasonable care. They contend that since the Plaintiffs bonds from Advest and had no contact with them, they owed no duty to the Plaintiffs.

PuttingPutting aside that the Amended Complaint expressly statesPutting aside that the Amended Complaint reliedrelied upon his representations before issuing insurance on the bonds,relies upon his representations before thethe duties owed by persons who know third parties will rely upon the informathe duties owed by persons who misguidem misguided. As the Bradford Defendants reluctantly concede, in Massachusetts liability is misguidem misguided. As the Bradford Defendants misrepresentationmisrepresentation is misrepresentation is notmisrepresentation is not limited by privity. Insurance is determinedetermined by the principles of § 552 of the Restatement (Second) ofTortsdetermined by the principles of § 552 of the Restatement (Second) ofTorts has adopted. That section provides:

OneOne who,One who, in the course of his business,One who, in the course of his business, professes to furnish information in connection with another transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false or misleading information for the guidance of others who are reasonably subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused by their reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable competence in obtaining or communicating the information. (Empended added).

See. e. g. Marram, 442 Mass at 60, 809, 442 Mass at 60, 809 N.E.2d at 1031, n. 25; Golber v. Golber v. BayBarron, 442 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 257 (Mass. App. , 1999).

TheThe persons who may reasonably rely on the information provided is limited. SectionThe persons who may reasonably rely on the information provided is limited. Section 552B limits the loss suffered to a person or one of a limited group of persons to whom the information provider intends to supply guidance he (the information provider) intends to supply guidance.

intends to supply it... .intends to supply it... . Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 426 Mass 491,, 4. 1368,1368, 1371-72 (1998).<sup>61</sup> Third parties who do not deal Third parties who do not deal directly with the information. Further, the comments to § 552 make information. Further, the comments to § 552 make is to become a plaintiff be known or identified to the defendant. is to become representation intends it to reach either a particular much larger class who might sooner or later have access to the information, and that the plaintiff proves to be a member or such a particular class. Restatement (Second) of Torts,proves to be h.h. See also, Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 426 Mass at 497, 688 N.E. 2d at 1372. In short, the absence of privity can be overcome short, the absence of defendant's knowledge of reliance by a particular class of persons.

Here, Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the Plaintiffs are within the Here, the Complaint sufficiently  
 BradfordBradford Defendants expected the Official StatementBradford Defendants expected the Official Statement  
 AmAmendedAmended Complaint states that the negligent statements were made for the express purpose Am  
 inducinginducing the Plaintiffs to purchase the bonds and write an insurance policy. At this stage of t  
 litigation, this is all that needs to be alleged.

The Bradford Defendants cite authority that holds that corporate negligent representation to open market security purchasers who rely upon their publicly issued statements. There is a substantial difference, however, between a public company whose stock can be purchased by anyone, and the real public company whose stock can be

<sup>61</sup> TheThe The informationThe informationThe information mustThe information must The information must alsoThe infor  
or aor a similar transaction.or a similar transaction. Nycal Corp. v. KPMG PeatMarwick LLP, 426 Mass at 496, 688 N.E. 2d at 1371-7  
is no dispute that the Bradford Defendants prepared the Official Statement for the bond offering.

Official Statement for a bond offering of an entity that does not otherwise issue public Official Statements. In the later case, the statements are made to a much smaller class, In the later case, the statements are made to a much smaller class, within the class will rely upon them is much greater.

A purchaser of securities in an initial offering of securities of a public corporation is necessarily dependant upon the Offering Statement about the previously private organization. Such organizations do not publicly issue financial statements or other informational briefings. They do not issue statistics and operational results. They are generally not followed by statistics and operational results. The Bradford Defendants had to have expected that Bradford and the Bradford Defendants had to have expected that debt securities would view the Offering Statement as the primary source of information about the advisability of the investment. The Offering Statement was written and promulgated by the Bradford Defendants specifically for the purpose of providing information to investors in the initial offering. It knew recipients of the Offering Statement would rely upon the information contained therein in making their investment decision.

On the other hand, secondary market purchasers of securities of a public corporation are a far more diffuse group. They represent a group of people far more diffuse group. They represent a group of people at many points in time. They have been exposed to a great variety of information about the corporation, including S.E.C. filings, media coverage, and even rumor and supposition. They do not necessarily know who the holders of the securities are, and have probably never communicated intentionally with many of them. The reliance upon the Offering Statement might be the result of a wide variety of factors, only one of which is information flowing from



management.

Not surprisingly, therefore, those cases which look at the secondary market find that it is different from the secondary market situation. In re Bank of Boston Securities Litigation, 762 F.Supp. 1525 (D. Mass. 1991) is the authority in this District. In that case, Judge Harrington considered the state law negligent misrepresentation claims of secondary market purchasers and dismissed them because they were based on disseminated information and there was no reliance on the information. The extent of public reliance on its public statements. The claims were brought by the public offering purchasers (the "acquisition class"), but simple acquisition class plaintiff would be required at trial to show direct reliance on the defendant's representations. In refusing to dismiss the acquisition class claim, the court held that the plaintiffs' ability to prove reliance at trial, ...at the time of the offering, make a determination as to their ability to do so. Id. at 1536. See also Extrusion Technologies, 150 F.R.D. 433 (D. Mass. 1993) (same holding)., 150 F.R.D. 433 (D. Mass. 1993). That the small class of public offering purchasers stand on a different footing from the secondary market purchaser who presumptively cannot satisfy the requirements for a claim in the initial offering, cannot have the negligent misrepresentation claims dismissed at this time.

Finally, the Bradford Defendants have raised the novel argument that the Restatement of the Restatement apply only to professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and architects, and not to corporate officers and directors who prepare securities filings. This argument is unsupported by any Massachusetts case law, and flies in the face of the Restatement which specifically attaches liability to a provider of negligent information.

business, business, profession, or employment... Clearly the drafters of t... Clearly the drafters of the Rest...  
corporate employees, in addition to businesses and professionals, corporate employees, in addition to busi...  
negligent misrepresentation. The Bradford Defendants provide no rationale why corporate  
employees who fail to exercise reasonable care in providing employees who fail to exercise reasonable ca...  
rely upon should be treated differently upon should be treated differently upon should be treated differ...  
including Marram, have corporate officers, have corporate officers who th, have corporate officers...  
misrepresentation. misrepresentation. misrepresentation. This Court should avoid a wholesalemisrepresentation.  
law.

## D. There Is No Basis To Dismiss The Plaintiffs Chapter 93A Claims

The arguments to dismiss Plaintiffs Chapter 93A claims and rely on the early sections of this memorandum arguments.

Defendants' arguments that Plaintiffs' complaint is baseless. It is well established that actionable claims of negligent misrepresentation can qualify as unfair and deceptive trade practices under M.G.L. c. 93A, § 11. Marram, 442 Mass. at 62, 809 N.E. 2d at 1032-33 (conduct that constitutes fraud or negligent misrepresentation may constitute violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, § 11). Stolz v. Waste Systems Int. Inc., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 765, 792 N.E. 2d 1031, 1045 (2003) (conduct that constitutes fraud or negligent misrepresentation may constitute violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, § 11). Accordingly, if any of plaintiffs' claims are valid, they constitute an action for violation of § 11.

TheThe BradfordThe Bradford PlaintiffsThe Bradford Plaintiffs assert they have not had a business relationship with the defendants and therefore 93A liability will not attach. Privity is notand therefore 93A liability will not attach. Privity is not established between the plaintiffs and defendants are involved in a commercial relationship which is the plaintiffs and defendants' relationship. insignificant. See Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick 965 F.Supp. 100, 124, 787 N.E. 2d 1060, 1078 (2d Cir. 1992); Boston Survey Consultants 388 Mass. 320, 321. 446 N.E. 2d 681 (1983) ; Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick 57 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 124, 787 N.E. 2d 1060, 1078 (2d Cir. 1992). whether the commercial relationship between the preparers and signerswhether the commercial relationship between the preparers and signers is sufficient for a publicly offered securityfor a publicly offered security and the initial purchasers of suchfor a publicly offered security. Massachusetts precedent demonstrates that it is not.

It is apparent that there has been a convergence, if not outright identity, between the concepts of reliance under § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, discussed in Section 9A, and the concept of a transactional business relationship which is defined in Chapter 93A. This is most evident in the case of Spencer v. Spencer, N.E.2d 1082 (2000). In that case, the Appeals Court reviewed the decision of the accounting firm to purchasers of securities of a public company that rejected the claim because the record was devoid of knowledge of any reliance by participants on the audit. This is precisely the same factor which determines liability in Massachusetts decisions addressing the applicability of § 552 of the Restatement. See, for example, Salkind v. Wang, 1995 WL 170122 (D. Mass. 1995) (open market purchase of commercial relationship with corporate officials); Young v. Deloitte & Touche, 1995 WL 170122 (D. Mass. 1995) (commercial relationship with corporate officials).

1818 Mass. L. Rptr. 287 (Mass. Super.) (no commercial relationship where defendant's activities  
not intended to help solicit people to purchase the company's not intended to help solicit people to purchase the  
809 N.E. 2d at 1017 (93A claim upheld for original purchaser 809 N.E. 2d at 1017 (93A claim upheld  
v.v. Waste Systems International, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 765, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 765, 792  
for original purchasers misled by for original purchasers misled by corporate officials); for original purchasers  
App. Ct. at 124, 787 N.E. 2d App. Ct. at 124, 787 N.E. 2d at 1078 (auditor with direct contact with prospective  
to liability).

Of the factors cited in those cases as supporting 93A liability, Of the factors cited in those cases as supporting 93A liability, The Bradford officials certainly knew that prospective purchasers would look at the Official Statement. They prepared and signed the Official Statement and Advest intended to use it to attract investors to purchase the securities. Prospective purchasers had few or no other sources of information. Importantly, they knew prospective purchasers would rely on the Statement. These facts overwhelmingly support the viability of a 93A claim. At oral argument, the court refused to conclude that there is no possible set of facts that would preclude the claim from the Bradford Defendants under ch. 93A, and accordingly, this claim cannot be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings.

E. The Court Cannot Consider The Trustee Defendants' Affirmative Defense That The Court  
Massachusetts Statutes Immunize Them From Liability To Establish The Defense Cannot Be Found In Their  
Documents The Court May Consider On A Motion To Dismiss

The Trustees Defendants seek to dismiss the Massachusetts cause of action. Massachusetts statutes limit liability for uncompensated trustees of non-profit corporations, M.G. L. c. 231, §§ 85K and 85W. But the Trustees do not receive compensation other than reimbursement for actual expenses to obtain the immunity. The allegations to that effect are contained within the Amended Complaint, but Defendants rely upon an Affidavit of Karen Sughrue to make the necessary factual showing.

The Court must deny the Trustee Defendants' efforts to apply the standard of review to the Motion To Dismiss. This court may only consider affirmative defenses from the allegations of the complaint, the documents, the record, and other matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Banco Santander de Puerto Rico v. Lopez-Stubbe (In re Colonial Mortgage Bankers, Corp.), 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). Consideration of documents not attached to the Complaint is forbidden. Waterson v. Page, 987 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). Nor may, 987 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). Nor Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F.Supp.2d 177, 185 (D. Mass. 1999).<sup>62</sup>

Without consideration of the Sughrue affidavit, the

<sup>62</sup> TheThe Plaintiffs wouldThe Plaintiffs would vigorously oppose any effort to convert the DismissDismiss intoDismiss into a Motion For Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.Dismiss into a Motion For Summary Judgment pursuant to the Court rules on the sufficiency of their complaint pursuant to the PSLRA. Accordingly, they cannot conduct thethe factual investigation to determine whether the Trustee Defendants truly qualify for the Massachusetts immuthe factual inv statutes.

factual showing necessary to qualify for the statutory immunities.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, their motion to dismiss on these grounds must be denied.<sup>64</sup>

**IV. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT BECAUSE THEY HAVE FAILED TO PROPERLY PLEAD THEIR CLAIMS.**

In the event the Court finds that there are pleading deficiencies in the Amended Complaint, leave is requested to correct them. Given the requirement that Plaintiffs be given leave to amend unless it is beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief, Swierkiewicz v. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and the liberal amendment, 534 U.S. 506, Rule 15, such leave is ordinarily granted.

Advest, however, has already stated that it opposes leave to amend the Complaint because the ground the Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once. That ground is not substantive. It merely added state court claims which derived from the same facts as the claims when the Superior Court stayed the Plaintiffs' parallel state court claims. Plaintiffs' parallel state court claims were filed before Defendants filed and served their motions to dismiss and, accordingly, Plaintiffs should have at least one point raised by their briefs. Plaintiffs should have claimed by the Defendants in their motions.

Nor have Plaintiffs unduly delayed. Plaintiffs served this action on the nineteen defendants in October 2004. It is the Defendants' fault that the Plaintiffs have not been able to serve the other nineteen defendants.

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<sup>63</sup> M.G.L. c. § 85K also requires proof that Bradford was qualified as a tax-exempt organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). There are no allegations in the Complaint to that effect and the Bradford Defendants provided no evidence of Bradford's status with the IRS.

<sup>64</sup> Plaintiffs do not accept that if Trustees of the Defendants' claims are dismissed, Plaintiffs will be entitled to dismiss the state law claims. However, as this matter is not properly before the Court, Plaintiffs do not brief these defenses at this time.

than four months to prepare motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs have than four months to prepare motions to c  
understand that Defendants require an additional two months to file a reply. understand that Defendants  
Defendants Defendants good faith in requesting these extensions, but Defendants good faith in requesting these  
these motions to dismiss fully briefed is not attributable to the Plaintiff.

futile and the Plaintiffs have acted equitably and appropriately. Amendment shall be granted if necessary.

## CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, denied in their entirety.

T.T. ROWE PRICET. ROWE PRICE TAX-FREE HIGHT. ROWE PRICE FUND INC., INC., SMITH INC., SMITH BARNEY INCOME INC., SMITH BARNEY BARNEY MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME BARNEY MUNICIPAL DRYDEN DRYDEN DRYDEN DRYDEN NATIONAL DRYDEN NATIONAL LOUIS LOUIS a LOIS and JOHN MOORE, and ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION

By their attorneys,

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